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Lazonick: The New Economy Business Model and Sustainable Prosperity 
The Rise of the New Economy Business Model 
 
The Internet boom of the last half of the 1990s seemed to herald the arrival of a “New 
Economy” with its promise that, after the stagnation of the early 1990s, innovation in 
information and communication technologies (ICT) would regenerate economic 
prosperity.  The subsequent collapse of the Internet boom at the beginning of the 2000s 
called into question the New Economy’s ability to deliver on this promise – and even 
raised questions about whether there had really been anything “new” about the economy 
of the late 1990s after all.  Perhaps the journalist John Cassidy (2002) was correct to 
entitle his well-documented book on the Internet boom “dot.con: the greatest story ever 
sold”.   If the “New Economy” was just all smoke and mirrors, one would expect that, 
once the debris left behind by the storm of speculation and corruption had been cleared 
away, economic life would return to what it had been before the boom took place. 
 
It is now clear that there was plenty of e-con in the New Economy.  At the same time, 
however, there was something new, important, and permanent about the New Economy 
that transformed the economic lives of many from those they had led before.  The core of 
that something new, important, and permanent is what I call the “New Economy business 
model” (NEBM), a mode of organizing business enterprises that has changed, perhaps 
dramatically, the ways in which, and terms on which, people in the United States are 
employed.   
 
NEBM emanated from Silicon Valley and spread to other regions of the United States.  
NEBM also affected employment relations in other areas of the world, especially Europe 
and Asia, as US-based ICT companies extended their global reach and as high-tech 
companies based outside the United States sought to adopt elements of the new business 
model.  With well-educated high-tech labor flowing into the United States from abroad, 
especially from India and China, and with US-based ICT companies offshoring various 
types of business activities to other countries, again especially to India and China, the 
ICT labor force had become by the 2000s vastly more globalized than it had been prior to 
the Internet revolution. 
 
While the Internet boom of the late 1990s made the “New Economy” a household phrase, 
the end of the boom did not result in the demise of NEBM.  To the contrary, its 
characteristic features have become more widespread and entrenched in the US ICT 
industries in the 2000s.  With its startup firms, vertical specialists, venture capital, and 
highly mobile labor, NEBM is a business model that remains dominant in the United 
States, and it is one that many national policy-makers and corporate executives around 
the world seek to emulate.  At the same time, within the United States, it is a business 
model that has been associated with volatile stock markets, unequal incomes, and 
unstable employment, including the insecurity associated with the offshoring of high-skill 
ICT jobs.  If we define “sustainable prosperity” as a state of economic affairs in which 
growth results in stable employment and an equitable distribution of income, then the 
prosperity of the US economy would appear to be unsustainable.  There is a need to 
understand the organizational and industrial dynamics of NEBM if only to determine how 
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the tapping of its innovative capability might be rendered compatible with more socially 
desirable outcomes. 
 
The “Old Economy business model” (OEBM) that dominated the US corporate economy 
in the decades after World War II and into the 1980s offered employment that was far 
more stable and earnings that were far more equitable than employment and earnings in 
the era of NEBM.  The sociological foundation of OEBM was the “organization man”.  
Popularized in the United States in the 1950s (Whyte 1956), the stereotypical 
“organization man” was a White, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant male who had obtained a 
college education right after high school, secured a well-paying job with an established 
company early in his career, and then worked his way up and around the corporate 
hierarchy over three or four decades of employment, with a substantial “defined benefit” 
pension, complemented by highly subsidized medical coverage, awaiting him on 
retirement.1   The employment stability offered by an established corporation was highly 
valued, while interfirm labor mobility was shunned.   
 
The “organization man” could trace his origins back to the early decades of the 20th 
century, and in the immediate post-World War II decades he was ubiquitous in the offices 
of the US corporate enterprises that were the dominant employers in the US economy.  
Somewhat ironically, when in the 1980s formidable Japanese competitors confronted US-
based Old Economy companies, many US observers of Japan’s “lifetime employment” 
system viewed it as a mode of organization that was quite alien to the American way of 
life.  In the post-World War II decades US business corporations had their own versions 
of lifetime employment, complete with what the Japanese call “salarymen”.  US 
corporations had over the course of the 20th century transformed the salaried professional, 
technical, and administrative employees who peopled the managerial structure into 
organization men.  By the 1950s and 1960s, moreover, even unionized production 
workers, ostensibly paid on an “hourly” rather than salaried basis, found that collective 
bargaining protected their positions of seniority, so that they too experienced, and in a 
growing economy came to expect, lifetime employment as well as defined-benefit 
pensions and comprehensive health benefits, just like the salaried managers of the 
companies for which they worked. 
 
From this historical perspective, NEBM can best be described as “the end of organization 
man”.  It is not that New Economy companies have ceased to build complex and durable 
organizations.  To attain and sustain competitive advantage, companies such as Intel, 
Microsoft, and Cisco – the gold-plated enterprises of the New Economy -- need to 
integrate the labor services of tens of thousands of individuals who participate in complex 
hierarchical and functional divisions of labor.  In an innovative enterprise, the role of an 
integrated division of labor is to develop and utilize new technologies.  Indeed, one might 
                                                 
1 In the early 1950s the sociologist C. Wright Mills (1951) had written an influential academic treatise on 
the significance of the “white collar” employee. William H. Whyte (1956), who wrote his best-selling 
The Organization Man while an editor of Fortune, later became a prominent urban sociologist. It is also 
worth noting that John Kenneth Galbraith (1967), an agricultural economist by training, gained many of 
his insights into what he eventually called the “technostructure” of The New Industrial State while an 
editor of Fortune in the late 1940s. 
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argue that, given heightened technological complexity and intensified market competition 
in the “open systems” world of ICT, the building of unique organizational capabilities has 
become more, not less, critical to the success of the enterprise than before.   
 
Nor is it necessarily the case that employees who spend their entire careers with one 
company have become an endangered species.  The leading industrial corporations still 
have low levels of employee turnover.   Rather what is new is the lack of a commitment., 
explicit or implicit, on the part of US high-tech companies to provide their employees 
with stable employment, skill formation, and rewarding careers.  When an employee 
begins to work for a company in the New Economy, he or she has no expectation of a 
career with that particular enterprise.  Nor does a person with ICT capabilities necessarily 
want to work for one company for years and decades on end.  Interfirm labor mobility 
can bring benefits to an employee, including working for a smaller company, choice of 
geographical location in which to work, a step increase in salary, access to employee 
stock options as a potential source of income in addition to a salary, and new learning 
experiences.  The New Economy business model represents dramatically diminished 
organizational commitment on both sides of the employment relation compared with its 
Old Economy predecessor.   
 
A corollary of this diminution in organizational commitment in NEBM has been an 
increased globalization of the types of labor that US-based ICT firms employ.  This 
globalization of labor has occurred through the offshoring of high-tech work and the 
international mobility of high-tech labor, neither of which is a new phenomenon but both 
of which have intensified over the past decade or so.  The employment relations of major 
US-based ICT companies have become thoroughly globalized, based on corporate 
strategies that benefit from not only lower wages but also the enhancement of ICT skill 
levels in non-US locations, especially in Asia and increasingly in Eastern Europe.    
 
While the extent of these impacts of NEBM on ICT employment has become evident 
only since the last half of the 1990s, NEBM itself has taken a half-century to unfold.  
Indeed, its origins can be found in the mid-1950s at precisely the time when the Old 
Economy industrial corporation was at the pinnacle of its power.  NEBM evolved as an 
integral element of the microelectronics revolution.  The development of computer chips 
from the late 1950s provided the technological foundation for the microcomputer 
revolution from the late 1970s, which in turn created the technological infrastructure for 
the commercialization of the Internet in the 1990s. While the US government and the 
research laboratories of established Old Economy corporations played major, and indeed 
indispensable, roles in supporting these developments, each wave of innovation generated 
opportunities for the emergence of startup companies that were to become central to the 
commercialization of the new technologies.  
 
The regional concentration of these new ventures in what would become known as 
Silicon Valley reinforced the emergence of a distinctive business model.  From the late 
1960s venture capitalists backed so many high-tech startups in the vicinity of Stanford 
University that they created a whole new industry for fostering the growth of young 
technology firms.  These startups lured “talent” from established companies by offering 
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them compensation in the form of stock options, typically as a partial substitute for 
salaries, with the potential payoff being the high market value of the stock after an initial 
public offering or the private sale of the young firm to an established corporation.  As 
these young companies grew, annual grants of stock options to a broad base of potentially 
highly mobile people became an important tool for retaining existing employees as well 
as attracting new ones.  The subsequent growth of these companies occurred, moreover, 
not only by investing more capital in new facilities and hiring more people but also by 
acquiring even newer high-tech companies, almost invariably using their own stock 
rather than cash as the acquisition currency.  In addition, wherever and whenever 
possible, ICT companies that, as systems integrators, designed, tested, and marketed final 
products outsourced manufacturing of components so that they could focus on higher 
value-added work.  This outsourcing strategy became both more economical and more 
efficient over time as contract manufacturers developed their capabilities, including 
global organizations and highly automated production processes, for a larger extent of the 
market.   
 
These features of the new ICT business model were already evident to industry observers 
in the late 1980s.  It was only in the Internet boom of the last half of the 1990s, however, 
that this ICT business model had a sufficient impact on product market competition and 
resource allocation, including interfirm labor mobility, as well as productivity to give 
popular definition to a “New Economy”.  In my book, Sustainable Prosperity in the New 
Economy?, I document the evolution of NEBM over the past half century as a foundation 
for understanding the origins of the globalization of ICT employment in the 2000s, and 
its current implications for ICT employment opportunities in the United States.   
 
My central argument is that NEBM has definitively replaced OEBM as the dominant 
mode of business organization in the ICT industries of the United States.  NEBM has 
been, and continues to be, an important engine of innovation in the US economy, and 
hence an important source of economic growth.  The performance of an economy, 
however, is not measured by growth alone.  Economists give high marks to an economy 
that not only generates growth but does so in a way that provides stable employment and 
an equitable income distribution -- what I call “sustainable prosperity”.  Yet over the past 
decade or so, NEBM has been an engine of innovation that has contributed to instability 
and inequity.  ICT continues to help make the United States the richest economy in the 
world, in terms of both absolute and per capita income.  The increased dominance of 
NEBM in the organization of the ICT industries, however, has meant increasingly 
insecure employment and incomes for most workers in the US ICT industries, and has 
become an important factor in the trend toward greater employment instability and 
income inequality in the US economy as a whole. 
 
Following the Internet boom and bust, what is particularly novel about the employment 
situation of the 2000s thus far has been the extent to which the most highly educated 
members of the US ICT labor force have experienced this insecurity as many of the well-
paid jobs that they used to hold have been offshored.   In terms of their education and 
qualifications, these are the people who in another era would have been the prototypical 
organization men, although they are no longer so uniformly White, Anglo-Saxon, 
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Protestant or male, as the organization men of the 1950s were apt to be.  The public 
outcry against the “export of American jobs” in this first decade of the twenty-first 
century in effect laments the demise of organization man.    
 
For whom does America compete? 
 
Driven by the microelectronics revolution, the United States has been highly innovative 
economy over the past three decades.  The resultant economic growth, however, has been 
unstable, while the distribution of income in the US economy has become significantly 
more unequal.  In my forthcoming book, Sustainable Prosperity in the New Economy?, I 
show that the transition from OEBM to NEBM in the ICT industries has contributed to 
this instability and inequity.  Gone is the collective security that the corporatist Old 
Economy business model once offered its employees.  In its place is a far more 
individualized relation between employer and employee.  The employment and incomes 
of even the most highly educated members of the US labor force are now much more 
susceptible to the pressures and vagaries of “market forces” than they were a few decades 
ago.  In particular, global labor markets and national financial markets now exert 
preponderant influences on the conditions of high-tech employment in the United States. 
 
In the regulation of the employment relation, “market forces” are not a natural state of 
affairs.   Rather the policies and decisions of corporations and governments shape how 
and in whose interests capital and labor markets function (Lazonick 1991 and 2003).  
Since the late 1970s in the United States corporate strategies and government policies 
have combined to define the ways in which NEBM allocates resources, employs labor, 
and finances investments.   
 
When US corporate executives systematically allocate billions of dollars to stock 
repurchases, they will argue that the stock market requires them to do so.  Yet in the 
2000s the powerful corporations that have the financial resources to engage in this 
practice are actually using their financial might to manipulate the stock market -- to the 
direct benefit of those executives who make resource-allocation decisions.  When US 
corporate executives systematically offshore as much productive activity as possible to 
lower-wage regions of the world, they will argue that the forces of market competition 
compel them to do so.  Yet in making these decisions they are generally unaccountable to 
current US-based employees who have helped to build the organizations that are capable 
of globalization, and they rarely consult with these employees about alternative strategies 
for maintaining and extending the competitiveness of the company.  Armed with the 
ideology of “maximizing shareholder value”, US corporate executives who control the 
allocation of their companies’ resources now simply take it as a fundamental, and self-
serving, assumption that they are responsible to shareholders alone. 
 
The US federal government has played a significant role in aiding and abetting the modes 
of resource allocation that prevail under NEBM.  It continues to devote tax revenues to 
fund the nation’s high-tech knowledge base, but demands little if any accountability from 
so-called “private” enterprises about how or for whose benefit this knowledge base is 
used.  If the top executives of US corporations that have benefited from government 
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largesse in the past now say they have to offshore to remain competitive, then the US 
government will not stand in the way or demand a quid pro quo.  Through its 
immigration legislation, the US government has accommodated, until recently at least, 
the demands of the high-tech lobby for more non-immigrant work visas, while providing 
little in the way of effective oversight over the use, and abuse, of these visas.  Through its 
tax policies, for the past three decades, the US government has basically taken the 
approach that whatever those who exercise strategic control over the allocation of 
corporate resources say they need to be competitive is what they need to get.  In failing to 
intervene to regulate the remuneration of corporate executives, the US government has 
been a party to the apparently never-ending explosion in top executive pay that the 
United States has witnessed over the past three decades.   
 
US corporate executives claim that they have a fiduciary responsibility to maximize 
shareholder value. Yet, as I have shown elsewhere (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000; 
Lazonick 2007c), it is a perspective that fails to address the conditions under which 
business enterprises are in fact innovative.  In particular, the ideology of “maximizing 
shareholder value” ignores the role of workers, communities, and governments in making 
investments in the innovation process without any guarantee of a return.  Indeed, even as 
corporate executives spout this ideology, and enrich themselves in the process, they are 
far from shy in appealing to the US government for increased spending on knowledge 
creation and lower burdens of taxation in order to keep the “United States” competitive.  
As a prime example, on March 16, 2005 the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA), 
accompanied by Dale Jorgenson, a neoclassical Harvard economist, organized a 
Washington, DC press conference in which it exhorted the US government to step up 
support for research in the physical sciences, including nanotechnology, to assure the 
continued technological leadership of the United States.  Intel CEO Craig Barrett was 
there as a SIA spokesperson to warn that “U.S. leadership in technology is under 
assault.”2   
 
The challenge we face is global in nature and broader in scope than any we have 
faced in the past. The initial step in responding to this challenge is that America 
must decide to compete. If we don’t compete and win, there will be very serious 
consequences for our standard of living and national security in the future….U.S. 
leadership in the nanoelectronics era is not guaranteed. It will take a massive, 
coordinated U.S. research effort involving academia, industry, and state and 
federal governments to ensure that America continues to be the world leader in 
information technology.  
 
Why, one might ask, should America “decide to compete” in ICT if a powerful company 
like Intel will be able to commercialize the new technologies that emerge from such “a 
massive, coordinated U.S. research effort” without any consideration of the extent to 
which Americans will benefit?  Barrett is also on record as saying: “Companies like Intel 
can do perfectly well in the global marketplace without hiring a single US employee.”3   
To echo a question that former US Labor Secretary Robert Reich (1990) in a well-known 
                                                 
2 “US could lose race for nanotech leadership, SIA panel says,” Electronic News, March 16, 2005. 
3  Craig Barrett, Interviewed by Tom Ashbrook, On Point, WBUR, February 11, 2006.  
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Harvard Business Review article in 1990, written before the transition to NEBM had 
become apparent: “Who is Us”?4   
 
In a world of global competition, a nation does need innovation to generate economic 
growth.  When, however, corporate executives use stock-based compensation to skew the 
distribution of income in their favor, and when they decide to terminate the employment 
of qualified people even as the company is reaping the returns on its past investments in 
innovation in which these very people participated, then it may well be that many US 
citizens will lose even as the companies for which they work, or used to work, remain 
profitable.  In the New Economy, “competitiveness” is, like “shareholder value”, a highly 
loaded ideological term.  To quote Harris Miller, from 1995 to 2006 president of the 
Information Technology Association of America, when he was a key lobbyist for the 
Immigration Act of 1990:  “We were successful because we refashioned the debate from 
the jobs displacement issue, where we always lost, to the competitive issue” (Lee 1991). 
 
Earning a living in the United States has never been easy for those who are poorly 
educated and lack work experience.  In the 2000s, however, even well-educated 
Americans with substantial work experience face far greater employment insecurity than 
they did in the past.  In documenting the instability and inequity inherent in NEBM, I am 
not advocating a return to OEBM.  There is a need, however, to recognize the collective 
functions that OEBM performed in providing security in employment and retirement to a 
significant proportion of the US labor force.  The fact that, in the Old Economy, US 
business corporations performed these functions greatly reduced the need for the 
government to be directly involved in ensuring stable and equitable growth.  I would 
even argue that because by the 1960s business corporations performed these collective 
functions for such a substantial portion of the population, the US government could 
contemplate launching a “War on Poverty” to upgrade the employment prospects of those 
segments of the US population for whom business corporations did not provide 
employment security.  In a variety of ways, OEBM provided a foundation, including a 
consensus among an economic elite, for the government to intervene in the economy to 
deal with problems of instability and inequity.  With the decline of OEBM, and its 
replacement by NEBM, from where will such a new consensus come? 
 
An era of more stable and more equitable economic growth 
 
An understanding of the historical context in which OEBM performed these collective 
functions in the post-World War II decades is critical for analyzing both the power of 
OEBM to provide a foundation for stable and equitable growth and its ultimate limits.  
The historical context was marked by: 
 
a)  government spending on World War II that resuscitated the US economy in the first 
half of the 1940s, thus lifting the United States out of the Great Depression that 
spanned the 1930s;  
                                                 
4  For the debate generated by the Reich article, see Lazonick and Mass (1995). 
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b)  the US government’s enormous investment after World War II in the context of the 
Cold War in the high-tech knowledge base, including national research efforts and a 
system of higher education to disseminate this knowledge;  
c)  the existence of powerful corporate research labs, many of them dating back to the 
beginning of the twentieth century, that could absorb and further develop that 
knowledge; and  
d)  a progressive tax regime that enabled the US government to intervene both to bolster 
the corporate foundations of sustainable prosperity and, when pushed by social 
movements, to try to spread the gains of prosperity through equal opportunity to those 
segments of the population that the corporate economy was leaving behind. 
 
The foundation of OEBM’s contribution to stable and equitable growth in the US 
economy was the provision of career employment.  Oligopolistic market positions and 
proprietary technology strategies enabled and encouraged the Old Economy corporation 
to offer career employment to its managerial labor force.  The presence in many Old 
Economy companies of industrial unions with their emphasis on employment security 
reinforced this corporate commitment to the “organization man”.  For managers and 
workers, a clear manifestation of the expectation of career employment was the inclusion, 
as integral to the employment relation, of a nonportable defined-benefit pension plan that 
rewarded longevity. 
 
In the New Economy, pensions, along with much else, are heavily dependent on the 
performance of the stock market.  In historical retrospect, a major reason why OEBM 
was able to contribute to stable and equitable growth was the limited role of the stock 
market, in its creation, control, combination, compensation, and cash functions, in the 
operations of its constituent corporations.  In OEBM the prime role of the stock market 
was to separate share ownership and managerial control, a key social condition for the 
managerial revolution that permitted experienced salaried employees to run established 
companies and rendered public shareholders powerless to intervene in the corporate 
allocation of resources.  By facilitating the separation of ownership and control, this 
“non-control” function of the stock market promoted stable and equitable economic 
growth under OEBM in the immediate post-World War II decades.  That record stands 
quite in contrast to the destabilizing influence of the shareholder-value driven “market for 
corporate control” that sought to unwind OEBM in the 1980s by “disgorging the free 
cash flow” (Lazonick 1992). 
 
In the era of OEBM, it was only in the context of the “hot issues” market in the late 
1950s and early 1960s that the over-the-counter (OTC) markets began to perform the 
“creation” function of the stock market by inducing investment in startups (O’Sullivan 
2007a).   In historical perspective, this speculative boom provided a glimpse into the role 
that new-venture IPOs would come to play in NEBM, and indeed  triggered the SEC’s 
Special Study of the Securities Markets (1963) that resulted eight years later in the 
formation of the National Association of Security Dealers Automated Quotation System, 
or NASDAQ (Ingebretsen 2002, ch. 4; O’Sullivan 2007).  In the absence of NASDAQ as 
well as an organized venture capital industry that could take full advantage of it, a startup 
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found it far more difficult to enter a high-tech industry and to challenge incumbents under 
OEBM than it would be the case under NEBM.  
 
Under OEBM, even established companies with listed shares, did not as a rule make use 
of the stock market to fund new investment in productive assets.  The period in which the 
stock market was an important source of cash under OEBM was during the speculative 
boom of the late 1920s when corporations sold stock at inflated prices to strengthen their 
balance sheets by paying off debt or building up their cash reserves – quite the opposite 
of what US industrial corporations did in the New Economy boom at the end of the 
twentieth century (Carpenter et al. 2003; O’Sullivan 2004).  While the speculative stock 
market of the late 1920s contributed to instability and inequity in the US economy as a 
whole, major business corporations in effect used that speculation to solidify their 
financial positions in advance of the inevitable financial crash, and as a result were better 
placed than they otherwise would have been to weather the early years of what became 
the Great Depression.5   
 
Although these corporations would subsequently lay off masses of production workers as 
the Depression deepened, thus creating conditions for the rise of industrial unionism, 
these corporations were able to keep their managerial organizations, and especially their 
R&D operations, intact.  As a result major managerial corporations sustained the process 
of knowledge accumulation throughout the 1930s so that, notwithstanding the debacle of 
the Great Depression, in the 1940s and 1950s these companies were able to resume their 
growth trajectories of the 1920s.  Aided by massive US government investment in the 
knowledge base, these corporations dominated their markets in the post-World War II 
decades, and provided the opportunities for career employment that gave rise to the 
phenomenon of the “organization man”.    
 
In the 1950s and 1960s the stock market also began to perform a compensation function 
under OEBM, but only for top executives -- a special privilege designed for tax 
avoidance that opened up this use of corporate stock to public criticism.  In historical 
retrospect, we can see the introduction of executive stock options as the first stage in the 
opportunistic separation of the rewards of top executives from the pay structures of the 
organizations over which they exercised strategic control.  The next stage in segmenting 
the interests of top executives from the organizations that they headed came in the 1960s 
when many of these executives tried to build empires through conglomeration, a 
movement that made OEBM unstable as corporations diversified into too many unrelated 
lines of business to be managed effectively.  Here too, as in the case of executive stock 
options, corporate stock performed a major function – what I have called “combination” 
– under OEBM, but one that contributed to instability and inequity in the economy and 
eventually contributed to the demise of OEBM.   
 
In both its compensation and combination functions, therefore, the stock market under 
NEBM fostered a separation in major corporations between the strategic allocation of 
                                                 
5  Japanese industrial corporations exhibited the same financial behavior in the Bubble Economy of the late 
1980s (Ide 1998), with the same salubrious effects on the balance sheets when the bubble burst (see 
Lazonick 1999 and 2005). 
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resources and the processes of organizational learning.  Yet the integration of strategy 
and learning is a sine qua non of innovative enterprise (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000b; 
O’Sullivan 2000a and 2000b; Lazonick 2004; Lazonick 2006b and 2007d).  This 
separation of strategy and learning rendered the US industrial corporation vulnerable to 
innovative competitors from abroad.  During the 1970s, and continuing in the 1980s US 
companies found that they were losing competitive advantage to foreign corporations in a 
number of key industries in which US manufacturers had been the world’s leading 
producers. Foreign companies had been able, through licensing agreements, multinational 
investments, and military contracts, to gain access to the US knowledge base.  Given 
their highly integrated skill bases, Japanese companies were the most adept among 
foreign competitors at absorbing this knowledge, and improving upon it through a 
process of indigenous innovation.  It is of significance that the business model that 
enabled Japanese companies to outcompete their US counterparts entailed more highly 
collectivized forms of OEBM that, through the institutions of cross shareholding, lifetime 
employment, and main-bank lending, permitted the superior development and utilization 
of technology (Lazonick 1998; 1999; and 2005). 
 
Reallocation of capital and labor from OEBM to NEBM 
 
The rise of NEBM in the 1960s and 1970s was only minimally influenced by the 
transformation that was taking place at the same time in the Japanese industrial economy.  
Nevertheless, in the 1980s and 1990s NEBM emerged as, in effect, the US response to 
Japanese competition.  Through its creation and compensation functions the US stock 
market supported the reallocation of capital and labor from OEBM to NEBM, while 
through its combination function it supported the rapid growth of New Economy firms.  
As such, the stock market became integral to NEBM in the 1990s and 2000s, especially 
in industries – most notably ICT but also biotech (Lazonick 2007c; Lazonick et al. 2007) 
-- that have enabled the United States to maintain its position of global high-tech 
leadership.  At the same time, however, the augmented role of the stock market in NEBM 
has since the 1980s rendered US economic growth unstable and inequitable.   
   
Through its creation and compensation functions, the stock market reallocated capital and 
labor from Old Economy wealth to New Economy startups.  The existence of a highly 
liquid stock market with lax listing requirements – namely, NASDAQ -- enhanced the 
prospect of an early and successful IPO, and thereby induced venture capital to invest in 
high-tech startups.  The offer of broad-based stock options, which would only become 
valuable with an IPO or a private sale to a listed company, encouraged members of the 
high-tech labor force to reallocate their services from OEBM to NEBM.  Once a new 
venture had done an IPO, the combination function then became important for the growth 
of New Economy firms, as epitomized by Cisco’s growth-through-acquisition strategy; 
From 1993 through 2000 Cisco did 71 acquisitions for $35.2 billion, of which over 98 
percent was paid in Cisco stock (Lazonick 2007c, 1012). 
 
Over the past three decades or so, a highly developed venture capital industry has 
represented a source of competitive strength for the US economy.  Venture capital has 
played a central role in the reallocation of resources from OEBM to NEBM by enabling 
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startups to tap entrepreneurship and knowledge that may have otherwise remained locked 
up in established corporations.  In its origins, the evolution of venture capital as a 
distinctive industry for new firm creation depended on Old Economy money.  In the 
1950s and 1960s the wealth of Old Economy families, including the Rockefellers, 
Mellons, and Whitneys, was an important source of venture capital funding.  In addition, 
from 1958, under the Small Business Administration, the US government provided 
subsidies to Small Business Investment Corporations (Noone and Rubel 1970; Wilson 
1986; Reiner 1989, ch. 5).  In the early 1970s there was only a trickle of institutional 
money invested in venture capital, and even that flow dried up when the passage of 
ERISA in 1974 created a fear among pension fund managers that they could be 
personally liable for making overly risky investments that violated the “prudent man” 
rule.  In July 1979 the well-known Department of Labor “clarification” of ERISA made it 
possible for pension fund managers of Old Economy companies to invest in venture 
capital without fear of being deemed imprudent under the law.   
 
The clarification of ERISA did not just happen.  Both the venture capital community and 
the managers of large corporate pension funds lobbied the US government for the 
relaxation of the strictures of ERISA (Avnimelech et al. 2005, 200-201).  In 1998 the 
National Venture Capital Association gave its first Lifetime Achievement Award to 
David Morgenthaler, a co-founder of NVCA in 1973, for his seminal lobbying efforts.  
According to the website of Morgenthaler, the venture capital firm that he founded in 
Menlo Park, CA in 1968: 
 
Among his many contributions to the emerging industry, Dave 
[Morgenthaler] was president of the National Venture Capital Association 
(NVCA) when the capital gains tax reduction was enacted in 1978, and 
played a leading role in testifying before Congress for the new legislation. 
He was also instrumental in helping pass the ERISA legislation of 1979, 
allowing for pension funds to invest in private equity for the first time.6 
  
In 1994 one of the first inductees into the Private Equity Hall of Fame was Janet Hickey, 
now co-managing director of Sprout Group, a venture capital affiliate of Credit Suisse.  
From 1970 to 1985, Hickey was involved in the management of General Electric’s 
pension fund, one of the largest in the United States.   According to the Private Equity 
Hall of Fame citation, “[t]wice she came to bat for the private equity community.” 
 
The first time followed the passage in 1974 of the federal Employment 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Intended to curtail abusive use 
of pension fund monies, ERISA had the unintended effect of discouraging 
all high-risk investing by corporate pension funds. Ms. Hickey worked 
with a coalition of pension funds and venture capitalists, who convinced 
the U.S. Labor Department in 1979 to “clarify” ERISA to permit pension 
funds to invest a “prudent” portion of their capital in high-risk assets. 
 
                                                 
6 http://www.morgenthaler.com/about.asp 
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Then, in the early 1980s, the Labor Department proposed new regulations 
that again would have halted venture investing by corporate pension 
funds. This time, Ms. Hickey led the effort that resulted in the Labor 
Department exempting “venture capital operating companies” from the 
proposed ERISA rules.7  
 
If venture capital reallocated capital from the Old Economy to the New Economy, stock 
options played a complementary role in the reallocation of labor.  Under NEBM, 
companies offered stock options to a broad base of professional, technical, and 
administrative employees to induce them to leave secure employment with Old Economy 
corporations and enter into insecure employment with New Economy startups.  In the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976, Congress had rescinded the capital-gains tax privilege for all 
future employee stock options (see Lazonick 2006a, 86-88).  The lowering of the capital-
gains tax in 1978 and a startup boom subsequent to the clarification of ERISA in 1979, 
however, set the stage for the American Electronics Association, a nationwide 
organization that emerged from Silicon Valley,8 to convince Congress in 1981 to bring 
back the stock option that qualified for capital-gains treatment (Bacon 1981).  At the 
same time, a company could also grant its employees non-qualified stock options on 
which ordinary taxes had to be paid at the time of exercise, but on which the company 
could claim a dollar-for-dollar tax credit without having to show the cost of stock options 
as an expense that would in turn reduce reported earnings (and as a result presumably 
place downward pressure on its stock price).  In 2000, at the peak of the boom, this tax 
benefit from non-qualified employee stock options was worth $887 million to Intel, 
$5,535 million to Microsoft, and $2,495 million to Cisco. 
 
Given the lowering of ordinary tax rates in the Reagan era of the early 1980s, non-
qualified options became a favored form of stock-based compensation, especially in 
Silicon Valley where new ventures abounded.  No longer were stock options viewed as 
an exclusive privilege of top executives as had been the case under OEBM.  Rather in the 
New Economy, stock options could be seen as necessary to attract “talent” to supply their 
expertise and effort to innovative new ventures that could drive the growth of the US 
economy. 
 
Venture capital and stock options, therefore, enabled NEBM to lure financial and human 
resources away from OEBM, and in the process made capital and labor much more 
mobile in the US economy than it had been in the past.  The existence of a highly liquid 
                                                 
7 Cited at http://www.assetnews.com/ped/hall_of_fame/hickey.htm, accessed July 26, 2004. 
8 According the website of the AeA (the official name of the American Electronics Association since 
2001), “AeA was founded in 1943 by David Packard and 25 of Hewlett-Packard's suppliers to help West 
Coast companies secure government contracts during World War II.  Originally operating as the West 
Coast Electronics Manufacturing Association (WCEMA), almost all of AeA's earliest members were 
located in California.  By 1946 WCEMA membership had doubled to 50 companies and by 1965 had 
climbed to 225. In 1969, WCEMA changed its name to the Western Electronic Manufacturers 
Association (WEMA) to reflect the growing membership outside of the Golden State.  By 1971 WEMA 
membership reached nearly 600 companies.  In 1977, the association once again changed its name to the 
American Electronics Association, in an effort to more accurately represent its 750 members 
nationwide.” http://www.aeanet.org/AboutAeA/aajl_historymain0807.asp. 
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stock market became critical to the rise of NEBM because, after an IPO, it permitted 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs to exit their equity investments in startups and high-
tech employees to sell the stock that they received when they exercised their options.  
The existence of a highly liquid stock market also enabled established companies to use 
their stock as a combination currency to buy young companies, and thus provided venture 
capitalists, entrepreneurs, and high-tech employees with an alternative to an IPO as a way 
of transforming their private equity holdings into liquid assets.  The use of stock as a 
combination currency served as an additional inducement, therefore, for money and 
people to flow into high-tech startups.    
 
The ubiquitous influence of the stock market 
 
In the 1990s the creation, compensation, and combination functions of the stock market 
were central to the expansion of NEBM.  Entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and high-
tech employees could claim that they were contributing their resources to an innovative 
economy, and reaping the rewards for these contributions through their stock holdings.  
In the 1990s, broad-based stock option plans spread to many Old Economy companies 
that now had to compete with New Economy companies for personnel.   
 
But during the 1980s and 1990s it was not just direct participants in innovative 
companies who were cashing in on a booming stock market, and thus developing a stake 
in its performance.  The end of fixed commissions on NYSE in 1975, in large part a 
response to competition from NASDAQ, lowered the transactions costs of trading on the 
stock market.  As a specialized, and indeed pioneering, application of computer 
networking, NASDAQ was well-positioned to take full advantage of the 
commercialization of the Internet in the 1990s (Ingrebretsen 2002).  The low transactions 
costs of buying and selling publicly traded shares enabled public investors, including the 
occupational group known as “day traders”, to share, with a click of the computer mouse, 
in the stock-price gains of the New Economy boom.    
 
As shown in Table 1, over the last half of the 20th century, Americans became 
increasingly invested in the stock market.  In 1999, holdings of corporate equities in the 
US economy were at a record 211 percent of GDP, about 3.5 times the percentage in 
1990, and holdings of corporate equities per capita were at a peak of $85,585 in 2006 
dollars.   In 2006, holdings of corporate equities per capita were 42 percent higher in real 
terms than they had been in 1996, at the onset of the New Economy boom.  Back in 1945 
households directly held over 93 percent of the value of corporate equities in the US 
economy; in 2006 only 30 percent.   Nevertheless in 2006, on a per capita basis, the direct 
holdings of households in 2006 dollars were more than five times greater than in 1945.  
Large numbers of Americans now have substantial wealth invested in the stock market, 
not only in direct holdings but also indirectly through their investments in mutual funds, 
pensions, and insurance policies.   
 
Foreigners now hold a much higher proportion of US corporate equities than previously.  
Foreigners held 5.7 percent ($639 billion in 2006 dollars) of the value of outstanding US 
corporate stock in 1995, but 11.8 percent ($2,467 billion) in 2006.  As a result, 
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Americans are now much more dependent than ever on foreigners to maintain the value 
of US stock prices. 
 
Pensions (private and government) held only 6 percent of corporate equities in 1965 by 
28 percent in 1985.  While this share stood at 23 percent in 2006, a steadily increasing 
proportion of savings has poured into mutual funds, which represented only 5 percent of 
corporate stockholdings in 1985 but 24 percent in 2006.  The growth of mutual funds 
reflected a shift from defined-benefit (DB) to defined-contribution (DC) pensions, and 
the trend toward the management of DC pensions through individual retirement accounts 
(IRAs).  The mutual fund share of IRA assets grew from 17 percent in 1985 to 49 percent 
in 1999.  Mutual funds absorbed 30 percent of DC assets, but only 6 percent of DB 
assets, in 1999, and were heavily invested in equities (Engen and Lenhart 2000, 802-
803).  
 
Table 1: Holdings of US corporate equities, 1945-2006 
 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Holdings in 2006$billions 1,341 1,197 2,125 2,863 4,703 4,319 3,145 3,657 4,254
Holdings per capita, 2006$ 10,049 7,861 12,807 15,844 24,332 21,062 14,564 16,061 17,838
Holdings as % of GDP 53 49 68 80 102 80 51 54 54
% share by type of holder         
Households 93.4 91.0 88.1 85.6 83.8 78.2 69.6 67.6 54.2
Private pensions 0.0 0.0 2.2 3.9 5.6 8.1 12.9 15.5 22.7
Government pensions 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.3 1.2 2.9 3.0 5.3
Insurance companies 2.4 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.9 3.3 5.0 5.3 5.8
Mutual funds 0.9 0.7 2.4 3.5 4.2 4.8 4.0 2.8 5.0
Rest of world 2.3 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.0 3.3 4.0 5.0 3.3
          
 1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Holdings in 2006$billions 5,447 11,219 20,636 17,429 13,336 17,112 18,558 19,106 20,906
Holdings per capita, 2006$ 21,776 42,090 73,075 61,081 46,271 58,788 63,144 64,408 69,826
Holdings as % of GDP 61 115 180 151 114 142 149 149 158
% share by type of holder         
Households 55.5 52.3 46.5 42.5 38.9 36.9 34.1 32.3 30.0
Private pensions 17.2 14.8 11.2 12.5 13.3 13.4 13.4 13.1 12.6
Government pensions 8.1 8.4 7.7 8.6 9.3 9.6 9.8 10.0 10.0
Insurance companies 4.6 5.2 6.1 6.4 7.2 7.0 7.2 10.1 7.6
Mutual funds 6.6 12.1 18.3 18.5 18.4 19.5 21.2 22.6 23.9
Rest of world 6.9 5.7 8.4 9.4 10.3 10.7 11.0 11.0 11.8
Notes: Data are for end of calendar year. 
           Households include nonprofit organizations 
           State pensions include state and local government retirement funds, both domestic and foreign.         
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2007, Table L213. 
 
In the last half of the 1990s, the booming stock market also became important to the 
finances of federal and state governments because of the amount of capital gains taxes 
that flowed into the public coffers.  For the period 1991-1995 federal government current 
tax receipts increased at an annual average rate of 6 percent, personal current tax 
payments making up 71 percent of receipts.  For the period 1996-2000, tax receipts rose 
by an annual average of 9 percent, with personal taxes making up 74 percent of receipts.  
After 28 straight years of current account deficits, the federal government ran surpluses 
from 1998 through 2001.  While for the periods 1990-93 and 1998-2001 federal tax 
receipts from individuals as a proportion of GDP rose from 8 percent to 10 percent, 
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capital gains tax receipts as a proportion of individual tax receipts rose from 6 percent to 
11 percent.  Then the stock market crashed, and in 2002-2005 individual tax receipts fell 
to 7 percent of GDP while capital gains tax receipts declined to 6 percent of individual 
tax receipts. From 2000 to 2003 federal current tax receipts fell by $254 billion, of which 
$225 billion came from a 23 percent decline in individual tax receipts, including $74 
billion in capital gains tax receipts (Congressional Budget Office 2004: 82-83; see also 
Congressional Budget Office 2002).   
 
Whereas under the Clinton administration booming stock markets had helped the federal 
government budget deficit to disappear, the bursting of the Internet bubble meant that 
from 2002 the Bush administration faced deficits that were not made any better by its 
commitment to tax cuts for the rich as well as the costs of borrowing funds for the 
invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.  The volatility of the stock market had its greatest 
impact on high-tech states such as California and Massachusetts, where the widespread 
use of employee stock options generated a tax bonanza in the boom and virtually no tax 
revenues in the bust (Dudley 2001; Mitchell 2003; Braunstein 2004).  Unfortunately most 
of the government bodies that reaped these gains from the speculative market pandered to 
the American taste for lower taxes, and hence declined to treat the capital-gains bonanza 
as the windfall that it obviously was (see for example Uchitelle, 2000; Rabin 2003).  
 
Given the influx of foreign money into US corporate equities, the booming stock market 
also supported US government efforts to maintain the value of the US dollar on global 
exchange markets in the face of persistent trade deficits in the 1980s and 1990s.  The 
United States has had a trade deficit in goods since 1976, and except for a small 
improvement in the recession of 2001, the deficit has grown larger in both nominal and 
real terms in every year since 1991.  During the New Economy boom, foreigners pumped 
money into US stock markets, so that the stock market rather than the bond market 
became the main capital-account item that was bolstering the value of the dollar.  
Textbook orthodoxy has it that when a nation’s interest rates rise, the value of that 
nation’s currency should strengthen.  But in the stock market boom, a fall in US interest 
rates led more domestic funds to be shifted from the bond market to the stock market, 
which in turn induced more foreign funds to be invested in US stocks, thus strengthening 
the US dollar exchange rate.  This dependence of the United States on the inflow of 
foreign funds to support the US stock market, and with it the US dollar exchange rate, has 
continued in the 2000s.      
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Innovation, speculation, redistribution 
  
As I have argue at length elsewhere (Lazonick 2007c; 2008, ch. 6), increases in stock 
prices can be driven by innovation, speculation, or redistribution.  All three drivers of the 
stock market may be acting in concert at any given time, in aggregate and at the level of 
individual companies.  Nevertheless, under NEBM one can argue that innovation was the 
main driver of stock-price appreciation in the 1980s and early 1990s, speculation in the 
late 1990s, and redistribution in the 2000s.  For example, as shown in Figure 1, the stock 
price movements of Intel and Microsoft since 1986 (when Microsoft did its IPO) can be 
divided along these lines into a decade in which stock-price increases came primarily 
from innovation with the companies reinvesting virtually all of their profits, a shorter 
period in which market speculation drove up their stock prices at a very rapid rate, and 
the redistributive phase in the 2000s in which stock buybacks combined with dividends 
have been instruments with which these companies have sought to support their stock 
prices in an effort, much encouraged by Wall Street, to re-attain the speculative stock-
price peaks of 2000 (Lazonick 2008, ch. 6). 
 
Among the major New Economy companies, Intel and Microsoft were by no means the 
most extreme cases of speculative price run-ups in the New Economy boom.  Figure 2 
replicates Figure 1, but with the stock-price movements of Cisco Systems added.  Given 
that Cisco’s stock price increased almost 1,000 times from its IPO in April 1990 to its 
peak in March 2000, the substantial rise in the stock prices of Intel and Microsoft, very 
obvious in the scale of Figure 1, are barely discernible in the scale of Figure 2. 
 
Like most New Economy companies, Intel, Microsoft, and Cisco Systems are traded on 
NASDAQ.  Figure 3 shows the extent to which the speculative bubble in the NASDAQ 
Composite Index made the movements of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA, 
which includes Intel and Microsoft as the NASDAQ representatives among its 30 stocks) 
and the S&P500 look like mere blips.  Between March 1998 and March 2000, the 
NASDAQ Composite Index of over 3,000 stocks rose by 149 percent compared with 21 
percent for the DJIA and 36 percent for the S&P500. 
 
The violent fluctuations of the stock market have imparted substantial instability to the 
US economy in general, and to household incomes and government tax returns in 
particular.  When, moreover, a major business enterprise bases its strategic decisions on 
the speculative value of its stock, as Lucent Technologies did in making its ill-fated 
acquisitions at the peak of the New Economy boom (see Lazonick 2008, ch. 4), the rise 
and fall of its stock price can exacerbate the instability of employment so that solid 
productive assets and jobs disappear in the downturn.   
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Notes: Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) consists of 30 stocks, of which 28 are listed on 
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 2 on NASDAQ.  S&P500 Index 
consists of 500 stock of which 85 percent are NYSE and 15 percent NASDAQ.  
NASDAQ Composite Index consists of 3,113 stocks. 
Source: Yahoo! Finance 
 
A prime example is the fate of Lucent’s Merrimack Valley Works (MVW), located in 
North Andover, Massachusetts, about 30 miles north of Boston (see Lazonick et al. 2002; 
Lazonick and Quimby 2007).  MVW began operations in 1952 as the Western Electric 
factory that manufactured telecommunications transmission equipment for AT&T’s Bell 
System, and moved to its North Andover site in 1956.  When in January 1984 the Bell 
System was broken up, MVW became part of the Networks Systems Division of AT&T.  
As a result of AT&T’s 1996 divestiture of its telecommunications equipment capabilities 
(including Bell Laboratories and product management groups), MVW became part of the 
Lucent Technologies Transmissions Systems division, which subsequently became 
known as the Optical Communications division.  With 1.8 million square feet of 
manufacturing floor space, MVW had employed a peak of more than 10,000 people in 
the mid-1970s.  In the boom of the late 1990s, with much more capital-intensive 
processes than in the past (by the end of 1999 all printed circuit board assembly had been 
outsourced), MVW still employed 5,600 people in jobs that were viewed as among the 
best in Boston’s Route 128 high-tech region. 
 
Among these employees were 250 university-educated engineers as well as about 3,000 
production workers represented by the Communications Workers of America (CWA).  
During the New Economy boom, in response to the demands of rapid product 
development in the plant’s optical networking products, MVW had been upgrading the 
skills of many of its production workers to function as testers, the highest skilled shop-
floor occupation.  When MVW could not generate sufficient employees with the requisite 
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capabilities internally to fill the demand for testers, its HR people searched New England 
community colleges for technically qualified recruits.  With this combination of 
engineering and production capabilities, in June 2000 Lucent designated MVW as the 
company’s “manufacturing center of excellence and global systems integration center” 
for optical networking products.9   
 
When that announcement was made, no one at Lucent imagined that within three years 
more than 80 percent of MVW’s employees would be gone, with most of the layoffs 
occurring in 2001 and early 2002.  In June 2002, with the telecommunications industry in 
a major slump, Lucent sold most of MVW’s manufacturing operations to a contract 
manufacturer, A-Plus (owned by Solectron), which agreed to employ about 550 people 
from MVW.  Lucent retained a product development staff of about 2,000 employees at 
MVW.   By April 2003 A-Plus had ceased operations, and Lucent’s MVW payroll was 
down to just over 1,000 people.  The CWA, which had represented some 3,000 workers 
at MVW as late as April 2001, had only 260 of its members employed by MVW in April 
2003 (Murray 2003a and 2003b).  In September 2003 the MVW campus was sold for 
$13.9 million to a local developer, with Lucent remaining as a tenant (Murray 2003c).  In 
June 2007 Alcatel-Lucent announced that it would close the North Andover operations, 
which employed 475 people, and move production to Italy (McCabe 2007a).10  
Beginning in December 2007, Alcatel-Lucent began laying off 290 CWA members, with 
plans to transfer 190 managerial employees to the company’s research center in 
Westford, Massachusetts (McCabe 2007b). Ultimately the misallocation of resources and 
financial machinations by Lucent’s corporate management in the New Economy boom 
resulted in the demise of what had been in 2000 a state-of-the-art manufacturing plant. 
                                                
 
If the increased reliance of households, governments, and corporations on the stock 
market has made the US economy more unstable, the distribution of returns from the 
stock market has made the US economy much more unequal.  In 2001 only 52 percent of 
households held stock directly or indirectly, and in 2004 only 49 percent.  In 2004, 37 
percent of all corporate equities were held by the wealthiest one percent of households, 
and 80 percent by the top 20 percent in the wealth distribution (Allegretto 2006).  
Moreover not all households who could claim that their savings were invested in the 
stock market benefited from the run of extraordinarily high returns on corporate stocks in 
the New Economy boom.  I am referring to organized labor, whose pension funds have 
been a key component of institutional investment in the stock market.  Virtually all 
unionized workers in the ICT industries are employed by Old Economy companies, 
where their retirement incomes are covered by a traditional defined-benefit pension plan.  
Given the size of these companies, these pension plans are all single-employer plans in 
which the employing corporation controls the allocation of pension assets and, as was the 
case in the New Economy boom, can lay claim to all of the stock-market returns from the 
pension portfolio over and above its liabilities under the DB contract.   
 
 
9  “Lucent Technologies selects Massachusetts site to become global optical systems integration center”,  
Lucent Technologies press release, June 7, 2000. 
10 For an analysis of what happened to the displaced MVW employes, based on training and re-employment 
data under a US Department of Labor National Emergency Grant, see Lazonick and Quimby 2007.   
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Organized labor showed concern with labor’s lack of influence over the governance of 
pension funds that represented what some have called “labor’s capital”, a stock of 
accumulated assets on which workers rely for a flow of “deferred wages” in retirement 
(see Ghilarducci 1992; Fung at al. 2001).  Of course, the unions would have liked a larger 
share of the gains that were being generated by the double-digit stock returns of the late 
1990s, but in single-employer DB plans that was not the American way.  The unions also 
wanted to direct “labor’s capital” to investments in companies that were “labor-friendly”; 
the labor movement understood from the experience of the 1980s and 1990s that stock 
market gains during the longest “bull run” in US history were often a direct result of the 
downsizing of the labor force.  In the United States, however, organized labor’s exclusion 
from participation in the allocation of the resources of traditional single-employer DB 
pension plans was and remains but an extension of its virtually total exclusion -- unique 
to the United States among advanced nations -- from participation in the governance of 
the resource-allocation decisions of major business corporations.  It is perhaps not 
surprising that with business sector union membership, and the power of organized labor 
more generally, in decline since the early 1980s, the US labor movement has failed to 
confront the ideology of shareholder value.11   
 
Under NEBM the challenge for organized labor -- to date unsuccessful -- has been to gain 
the right to represent high-tech workers in collective bargaining.  Organized labor in the 
United States has never been strong among the professional, technical, and administrative 
(PTA) employees who constitute the majority of employees in New Economy firms.  The 
most significant example of PTA unionism in the United States is the Society of 
Professional Engineering Employees in Aerospace (SPEEA) which has almost 24,000 
members, and has represented engineers and technicians at Boeing (founded in Seattle in 
1916) in collective bargaining for over six decades.  Indeed in 2000 SPEEA staged the 
largest white-collar strike in US history against Boeing, with wages and health benefits at 
issue (Morrow 2000a and 2000b).  Organizing PTA workers is, however, especially 
difficult in the New Economy, where, to use Albert Hirschman’s (1970) terms, 
employees have depended on “exit” via the labor market rather than “voice” via union 
representation to exercise influence over their conditions of work and pay.12    
 
The most notable attempt to organize US high-tech employees in the 1990s stemmed 
from Microsoft’s practice of employing contingent workers (Van Jaarsveld 2004).  In 
1990 the Internal Revenue Service had ruled that Microsoft had been misclassifying 
regular employees as independent contractors in order to exclude them from benefits such 
as the employee stock purchase plan and savings plan.  In 1992 these workers launched a 
class action lawsuit (Vizcaino v. Microsoft) that was finally settled in December 2000 
with a payment from Microsoft of $97 million.   
 
                                                 
11 That organized labor in the United States lacked an analysis of the changing functions of the stock 
market in the US corporate economy and a critique of shareholder-value ideology is evident in the 
volume, Working Capital: The Power of Labor’s Pensions (Fung et al., 2001), the major publication 
(based on a conference in Washington DC in 1999) of the United Steelworkers of America’s Heartland 
Labor Capital Project (see also http://www.heartlandnetwork.org/conference4_99/index.htm). 
12 For the problems of unionism in the “boundaryless workplace”, see Stone 2004. 
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The lawsuit also mobilized contingent workers at Microsoft to form, in 1998, the 
Washington Alliance of Technology Workers (WashTech), a union that affiliated with 
the Communication Workers of America.13  While WashTech has been unsuccessful in 
gaining union recognition at Microsoft or any other employer, it has wielded a certain 
amount of political influence in the state of Washington, and has participated in CWA 
training initiatives (Van Jaarsveld 2004, 373-379).  In 2000 WashTech came to the aid of 
customer service representatives who had been laid off at Amazon.com, and was 
reportedly able to pressure the company to grant them better severance packages (Wilson 
and Blain 2001).  Also affiliated with the CWA is Alliance@IBM formed in 1999 in 
response to IBM’s adoption of a cash-balance pension plan that significantly reduced the 
pension benefits of older IBM employees (Lazonick 2008, ch. 4).14   In the downturn of 
the early 2000s these types of organizing initiatives fed a discussion of the potential of 
“open-source unionism” (which should have been termed, more accurately, “open-
systems unionism”), a form of labor organization that could provide mutual aid and 
political influence for New Economy workers whose power vis-à-vis employers resides 
in individual mobility on labor markets rather than in collective bargaining at the place of 
work (see Freeman and Rogers 2002).  
 
For many ICT employees, the power of individual labor mobility served them well in the 
New Economy boom of the late 1990s, especially when they entered into employment at 
companies with generous stock-option plans.  Elsewhere (Lazonick 2007c, 1015-1021) I 
have shown the enormous average gains of employees at companies like Microsoft and 
Cisco in the New Economy; so much so that virtually all of the increase in income 
inequality in the United States in 1999-2000 can be explained by the extraordinary 
increases in average wages in four counties in the United States – three in California that 
include Silicon Valley and one in the state of Washington that includes Microsoft 
(Galbraith and Hale 2004).  It has been claimed, quite plausibly, that at Microsoft the 
boom created 10,000 stock-option millionaires (Harden 2003).15 
 
These were gains that all the collective bargaining in the world could not have obtained.   
Serving as they do to manage the interfirm mobility of labor -- a prime characteristic of 
NEBM -- broad-based stock options are the antithesis of collectively bargained wages.  
The relative remuneration of high-tech workers depends on the vagaries of the stock 
market, with some people finding themselves at the right place at the right time, and other 
people just like them being at the wrong place at the wrong time.  Even at companies like 
Cisco and Microsoft, where option awards abounded, people employed at the peak of the 
boom in 2000 and then let go in the downturn of 2001-2002 would have found 
themselves with absolutely no gains from the options that they received.   
 
The growth of NEBM culminating in the tight labor markets of the late 1990s, and the 
very real and often realized possibilities for substantial gains from stock options, inured 
high-tech employees to an employment system in which their career prospects might be 
                                                 
13 See http://www.washtech.org/about/.  For useful works that focus on the roles of contingent employment 
and flexible labor markets in Silicon Valley, see Benner 2002 and Hyde 2003. 
14 http://www.allianceibm.org/ 
15 For the distribution of stock options at Cisco in 1999, see O’Reilly and Pfeffer 2000. 
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dependent on interfirm labor mobility rather than the movement up and around the 
hierarchy of one company.  But the good times were not to last.  The high levels of 
employment in the ICT professions in 2002 and 2003 sent a rude shock to engineers and 
programmers who had become used to the idea that interfirm labor mobility would 
provide them with the possibility of improving their conditions of work and pay, should 
they become dissatisfied with the prospect of remaining with their current employer.   
 
For Internet bloggers, a particularly well-known example of the deterioration of the 
conditions of work and pay among high-tech workers in the first half of the 2000s was 
that of an Electronics Art software engineer whose spouse (female, as it turned out) 
posted an anonymous open letter on LiveJournal, in November 2004 entitled “EA: The 
Human Story”.16  The complaint was that, under a permanent “crunch” to meet 
videogame publishing deadlines, EA compelled game developers like her spouse to work 
85-hour weeks: “9am to 10pm -- seven days a week -- with the occasional Saturday 
evening off for good behavior (at 6:30pm).”  For working these long hours, game 
developers received no overtime pay, extra time off, or sick days.  In effect, EA 
considered these employees to be salaried personnel who were exempt from the overtime 
pay requirements of the National Labor Relations Act.   
 
Within a month of publication of the open letter, over 4,000 people posted comments on 
LiveJournal, almost all in support of the “EA Spouse”, with many advising that EA 
employees should join a union.  As it happened, under California law, many of the game 
developers had a claim to overtime pay.  EA agreed to the settlement of two class action 
lawsuits for overtime pay, one by its graphic designers for $15.6 million in October 2005, 
and the other by its programmers for $14.9 million in April 2006.  In both cases, EA then 
transformed those among the labor force who were non-exempt under the California law 
into hourly employees who would henceforth be paid time-and-a-half for overtime hours.  
As part of this change, EA gave these workers a one-time grant of EA stock, but ruled 
them ineligible for EA stock options.17 
  
Offshoring, in-migration, and the employment of ICT labor 
  
As illustrated in the EA story, the deterioration in employment conditions that faced high-
tech labor in the first half of the 2000s extended beyond the downturn in economic 
activity in 2001-2002.  Unemployment rates among engineers and programmers rose in 
the “jobless recovery” that began in late 2002 (Hira 2003; Khatiwada and Sum 2004).18  
A major part of the explanation for the jobless recovery in ICT was the acceleration of 
offshoring of ICT jobs from the United States in the early 2000s (Groshen and Potter 
2003; Houseman 2007), with India and China as the favored locations.  There exist no 
                                                 
16 http://ea-spouse.livejournal.com/; see also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Erin_Hoffman. 
17 “Electronics Arts settles overtime suit, will reclassify entry-level artists,” October 5, 2005, at 
http://www.gamasutra.com/php-bin/news_index.php?story=6747; Programmers win EA overtime 
settlement, EA spouse revealed,” April 26, 2006, at http://www.gamasutra.com/php-
bin/news_index.php?story=9051. 
18 See IEEE-USA press release, May 4, 2004 at http://www.ieeeusa.org/releases/2004/050404pr.html; See 
IEEE-USA press release, July 26, 2004 at http://www.ieeeusa.org/releases/2004/072604pr.html; also 
Hira 2003. 
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reliable data on the extent of offshoring, the proportion of offshored jobs that are high 
skill, or the impacts of offshoring on employment in the United States and the 
performance of the US economy as a whole.19  What is clear is that US companies have 
over the past decade or so been able to access growing supplies of high-tech labor in 
India and China with the capabilities to perform increasingly sophisticated work that had 
previously been done in the United States (Lazonick 2007b; Lazonick 2008, ch. 7).   
 
Indeed, when US companies offshore, some of the high-quality, high-tech labor that these 
companies employ in places like China and India actually gained their work experience, 
and sometimes also their graduate education, in the United States.   In May 2007, The 
Indus Entrepreneurs (TiE) Group put out a story that 60,000 IT professionals had 
returned to India from Silicon Valley “in recent years”; probably meaning since 2001.20  
Such a figure is certainly plausible.  What we do know is that, in recent years, US MNCs 
such as IBM, HP, and Accenture have been expanding their employment in India at a 
rapid pace.  Undoubtedly, as these companies offshore, many of the key employees are 
Indians who have worked for these companies under immigrant and non-immigrant visas 
in the United States.  Such is certainly the case for Indian IT services companies such as 
TCS, Wipro, and Infosys, which have been among the leading users of H-1B visas in the 
United States in the 2000s even as their strategic orientations have been to return back to 
India as much of the work as possible that is being done in the United States (Lazonick 
2008. ch. 7). 
 
The H-1B program has come under heavy criticism from those who see the influx of non-
immigrant labor into the United States as subverting the remuneration and work 
conditions of permanent members of the US labor force (Matloff 2004). In principle, 
employers are supposed to pay workers on H-1B visas “at least the local prevailing wage 
or the actual wage level paid by the employer to others with similar experience and 
qualifications, whichever is higher.”  The law also stipulates that an employer can only 
engage someone on an H-1B visa, if such employment “will not adversely affect the 
working conditions of workers similarly employed”.21  In practice, it is difficult to 
enforce these labor conditions since there is little if any enforcement for non-compliance 
on the part of the employer.22   Even when the employer complies with the letter of the 
law, the H-1B worker is not in the same position of power vis-à-vis her employer as a US 
citizen or permanent resident.  Under NEBM, the power of the employee resides in her 
ability to switch jobs.  An H-1B worker can only leave her employer, and remain in the 
United States, if she can find another employer with a vacant H-1B visa ready to hire her.  
The employer may use his leverage over H-1B employees to demand that they be 
reassigned to different geographic locations within the United States that regular 
members of the US labor force might be unwilling to accept.  The dependency of the H-
1B worker on her employer will be even greater, moreover, when the employer has 
                                                 
19 For an attempt to use newspapers articles and press releases to track the number of offshored jobs and the 
companies that are doing the offshoring, see the TechsUnite offshore tracker at 
http://www.techsunite.org/offshore/. 
20 “60,000 Indian techies in US return home: Report,” Times of India, May 14, 2007. 
21 http://www.dol.gov/eta/regs/fedreg/proposed/2005006454.htm 
22 For a list of problems with the H-1B program from an anti-H-1B website, see 
http://www.zazona.com/ShameH1B/H1BFAQs.htm#IfH-1BAbolished. 
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sponsored the employee for US permanent residency, the acquisition of which may be a 
long, drawn-out process (Chakravartty 2006). 
  
The annual new H-1B visa cap was 65,000 through 1998, 115,000 in 1999 and 2000, and 
195,000 in 2001 through 2003, before reverting back to 65,000 in 2004, with an 
additional 20,000 for foreigners with a graduate degree from a US university or people 
hired by a US institution of higher education or non-profit research organization.  The 
cap was fully utilized in the boom conditions of 1997 through 2000 when Congress 
authorized the 195,000 level -- just in time for the downturn.  The number of unused 
visas rose from 31,400 visas (or 16 percent of the total) in 2001, 115,900 (59 percent) in 
2002, and 117,000 (60 percent) in 2003, before the normal cap was lowered to its original 
level of 65,000 – just in time for the post-“jobless-recovery” upturn (Wasem 2006).  With 
all of these 65,000 visas being snapped up quickly since 2004, high-tech employers have 
been clamoring for a substantial increase in the cap that would alleviate, so they claim, a 
shortage of high-tech labor in the United States.  The Comprehensive Immigration 
Reform Bill that was passed in the Senate in May 2006 would have raised the H-1B cap 
to 115,000 with an automatic increase of 20,000 per year whenever the previous year’s 
quota was reached.23  In 2007, however, legislative approval for an increase was stalled 
in the House of Representatives, not over the H-1B question, but rather, given the 
comprehensive intentions of the bill, over the treatment of illegal foreign entrants to the 
US labor force. 
 
There is considerable debate over whether in the 2000s there exists a shortage or surplus 
of high-tech labor in the United States (Gordon 2007).  ICT employers generally argue 
that there is shortage of high-tech labor.  Absent a remedy that includes, in the short-run, 
an expansion of the H-1B visa program and, in the long run, an upgrading of the US K-12 
education system, they warn of a deterioration of innovative capabilities in the United 
States and a further acceleration of offshoring of high-tech jobs.  A particularly 
influential statement of this position appeared in an op-ed piece that Bill Gates (2007) 
published in the Washington Post in February 2007.  Gates began: 
Innovation is the source of U.S. economic leadership and the foundation 
for our competitiveness in the global economy.  Government investment 
in research, strong intellectual property laws and efficient capital markets 
are among the reasons that America has for decades been best at 
transforming new ideas into successful businesses.  The most important 
factor is our workforce. Scientists and engineers trained in U.S. 
universities -- the world’s best -- have pioneered key technologies such as 
the microprocessor, creating industries and generating millions of high-
paying jobs.  But our status as the world’s center for new ideas cannot be 
taken for granted. Other governments are waking up to the vital role 
innovation plays in competitiveness. 
Gates then went on to say that the US schooling system had to be improved to enable 
“young Americans [to] enter the workforce with the math, science and problem-solving 
                                                 
23 See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comprehensive_Immigration_Reform_Act_of_2006. 
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skills they need to succeed in the knowledge economy.”  He cited a 2003 report that 
found that US high school students ranked 24th out of 29 developed economies in math 
scores.24  Gates called upon business and government to work together to improve the 
delivery of science and math education in the US K-12 system. 
 
He also counseled that the United States should make it “easier for foreign-born scientists 
and engineers to work for U.S. companies.”  Indeed, Gates argued that the shortage of 
computer science graduates in the United States had reached a “crisis point”.  He called 
for an increase in the quota of H-1B visas as well as a faster and simpler process for 
acquiring permanent residency.  Given that foreigners constitute half of the doctoral 
candidates in computer sciences in the United States, an important impact of these 
changes would be to increase the number of foreign graduates from US universities who 
remain in the United States after completion of their studies.   In testimony to Congress in 
March 2007, Gates noted that in fiscal 2008 (the year beginning on October 1, 2007), the 
65,000 regular quota of H-1B visas plus additional 20,000 quota for visa holders with US 
graduate degrees would probably by snapped up by companies in the first month.  If so, 
Gates observed, “for the first time in the history of the program, the supply will run out 
before the year’s graduating students get their degrees.  This means that U.S. employers 
will not be able to get H-1B visas for an entire crop of U.S. graduates. We are essentially 
asking top talent to leave the U.S.” (quoted in Elstrom 2007).  As it happens, on April 2 
and 3, 2007, the first two days on which applications could be filed for fiscal 2008 H-1B 
visas, the 65,000 quota was oversubscribed while 18,000 of the 20,000 graduate degree 
supplement were snapped up (Raskin et al. 2007; Taylor 2007). 
 
Not surprisingly, the United States branch of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers, which “promotes the careers and public-policy interests of more than 220,000 
engineers, scientists and allied professionals” (IEEE-USA 2006 Annual Report, 225) is far 
from enthusiastic about changes in immigration law that would expand the supply of 
high-tech workers in the United States.  After the US Senate passed the Comprehensive 
Reform Bill in May 2006, IEEE-USA President Ralph W. Wyndrum, Jr. commented that 
“The bill opens the spigot on numerous skilled visa categories. The question is how many 
high-tech workers can the United States absorb annually without driving up 
unemployment and driving down wages? The Senate demonstrated its concern about the 
number of unskilled workers it would allow into our country; it should show the same 
concern for skilled employees.”26   
 
Responding generally to claims of crisis in the reproduction and expansion of the STEM 
(scientific, technical, engineering and mathematics) workforce in the United States, a 
2004 study by the RAND corporation for the US Office for Science and Technology 
Policy and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, argued that “many of these claims of 
                                                 
24 Gates was undoubtedly referring to the 2003 International Student Math Assessment, sponsored by the 
OECD Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) (OECD 2004), which is discussed 
below.   
25 Available at http://www.ieeeusa.org/about/Annual_Report/2006.pdf. 
26 http://www.ieee-cr-section.org/content.asp?ID=1296&I=5169 
 25
Lazonick: The New Economy Business Model and Sustainable Prosperity 
shortfalls are suspect or are based on metrics that must be taken in context” (Kelly et al. 
2004, 5). 
 
Viewed broadly since the 1950s, evidence for these periodically 
anticipated shortages in the general STEM workforce have been hard to 
find.  Indications of resulting national crisis have, so far, been even less 
evident.  Ironically, the closest thing to a crisis was perhaps the distress of 
unemployed and underemployed engineers in the early 1970s, 
mathematicians and physicists in the 1990s, molecular and cellular 
biologists in the late 1990s, and Silicon Valley scientists and engineers 
thereafter.  But these are manifestations of surpluses, not shortages, in the 
STEM workforce. 
 
Writing during the “jobless recovery” of 2003, Michael S. Teitelbaum (2004, 13), a 
demographer and program director (now vice-president) at the Alfred P. Sloan 
Foundation, observed that “[t]he profound irony of many such claims [of labor shortage] 
 
is the disjuncture between practice in the scientific and engineering 
professions – in which accurate empirical evidence and careful analyses 
are essential – and that among promoters of “shortage” claims in the 
public sphere, where the analytical rigor is often, to be kind, quite weak.  
Few, if any of the market indicators signaling shortages exist.  Strong 
upward pressure on real wages and low unemployment rates relative to 
other education-intensive professions are two such indicators 
conspicuously absent from the contemporary marketplace. 
Rhetoric of crises aside, given rapid changes in technology and the high degree of 
specialization of high-tech workers, the possibility exists that these two very different 
perspectives on the adequacy of the supply of high-tech personnel in the United States are 
in fact two sides of an age-related coin.   It is quite plausible that at any point in time 
there is a labor market “mismatch” between the skill-set of the extant supply of high-tech 
employees and the demand for new skills inherent in new high-tech jobs (see Levy and 
Murnane 1992; Morris and Western 1999; Powell and Snellman 2004).  It is also quite 
plausible that, for members of the ICT labor force generally, one’s age has an inverse 
relation to the relevance of one’s learned skills to meet new demands for ICT labor.  If 
companies are systematically employing younger workers, ostensibly with up-to-date 
skills, and systematically laying off older workers, ostensibly with obsolete skills, it is 
quite possible that there will exist, simultaneously, a shortage of the new workers that 
companies want to hire and a surplus of the old workers that companies have decided to 
fire. 
Such a scenario is entirely consistent with everything we know about the transition from 
OEBM to NEBM.   A key characteristic of NEBM is a lack of commitment by companies 
to career employment.  Under NEBM, companies continue to value the productivity that 
emanates from the experience of many of their existing employees, and for employees the 
prospect of promotion within the organizational hierarchy still can serve as a powerful 
inducement for supplying more and better effort in making productive contributions to 
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the firm.  At the same time, however, under NEBM there are no institutional constraints 
to terminating some employees even as, or often because, the company seeks to take 
advantage of new profitable opportunities that result from changes in its industry’s 
technological, market, or competitive conditions.  When such opportunities present 
themselves – and in the fast-changing ICT industries such events are regular and perhaps 
even continuous phenomena – the company will be apt to replace older workers with 
younger workers.    
 
In sharp contrast, a key characteristic of OEBM was the employment of older workers.  
One need only look at the transformation in employment relations at IBM between 1990 
and 1994 (Lazonick 2008, ch. 4) to see how older employees could be made redundant as 
the company restructured with a bias toward hiring younger employees.  A central 
purpose of IBM’s massive restructuring in the 1990s was to rid itself of its decades old 
system of “lifelong employment”. Indeed, in 1994 about 3,500 IBM employees filed a 
class action lawsuit against the US Internal Revenue Service, claiming that IBM should 
not have withheld taxes on their severance pay since these awards represented a legal 
settlement obtained in return for signing an agreement in which they waived their right to 
sue IBM for age discrimination (Ramstad 1994a and 1994b; Debare 1997).27  In 1995 
and 1999, IBM made fundamental changes in its pension system for the expressed 
purpose of making the company more attractive to younger employees (Lazonick 2008, 
ch. 5).  In the process, older IBM employees were short-changed, although CEO Louis 
Gerstner agreed to reduce the damage to many of them when Rep. Bernie Sanders and 
Sen. Jim Jeffords, both of Vermont, threatened that the federal government would go 
after IBM for age discrimination. 
                                                
 
Given its size, reputation, and central position in the ICT industries, IBM’s 
transformation from OEBM to NEBM marked a fundamental juncture in the transition 
from employment security to employment insecurity in the US corporate economy.  
Indeed, in line with the IBM experience, for the period 1992-1997 John Abowd and his 
co-authors (2007) find a general shift in US employment from older experienced workers 
to younger skilled workers related to the adoption of computer technologies.  Using 
Current Population Survey data, Charles Schultze (1999, 10) has shown that “[f]rom 
1983 to 1998, median job tenure for men as a whole fell just a little, from 4.1 years to 3.8 
years. But broken down by age, the picture is different.  ” 
 
While the median tenure of the two youngest age groups fell only slightly, 
the tenure of older men fell substantially.  Some of the decline in the 55-
64 group—from 15.3 years to 11.2 years—undoubtedly reflects the 
continuing trend to earlier retirement, but the reductions in average tenure 
among the 35-44 year age group (from 7.3 years to 5.5 years) and among 
the 45-54 year age group (12.8 to 9.4 years) are quite large.  The situation 
here is the reversal of that before 1981: the widespread decline in average 
male tenure between 1983 and 1998 is masked by the aging of the baby 
 
27 See also “Lotus Development ordered to pay $275,000 in age discrimination suit,” Associated Press, 
November 30, 1994; “Ex-IBMers file redux of suit against severance tax,” Raleigh News and Observer, 
March 29, 1996, C9. 
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boomers, which decreased the relative importance of younger and low-
tenured groups. When that demographic change is taken into account, 
tenure fell rather sharply.  Middle-aged and older men, for whatever 
reason, are not staying as long with their employers as they once did. 
 
Schultze (1999, 11) goes on to show, moreover, that the job displacement rate for white-
collar workers relative to blue-collar workers rose substantially in the 1980s and 1990s, 
starting at 33 percent in 1981-1982 and rising to about 80 percent in the 1990s. 
 
In late 1998, as the New Economy boom gained momentum and as Congress stood ready 
to increase the H-1B visa cap from 65,000 to 115,000, IEEE-USA published its 
“Misfortune 500” – a website with letters from hundreds of experienced engineers who 
had lost their jobs and could not find work as engineers during the boom.28  In IEEE-
USA surveys of unemployed engineers, age was listed as the primary barrier to getting a 
new job by 67 percent of respondents in 2004 and 72 percent in 2006.29 
  
While anecdotal information abounds on the displacement of senior ICT personnel in the 
1990s and 2000s (see, for example, Hira 2007), there remains a deficiency of systematic 
research on this phenomenon.  For example, HP’s “churning” of its labor force in the 
2000s, subsequent to the merger with Compaq, presumably reduced the average age of 
employees (Wong 2006); it would be of interest to know how older employees fared 
relative to younger employees when thousands of positions were eliminated in the 
aftermath of the merger.   In the absence of firm evidence, it is also debatable whether the 
displacement of older workers in favor of younger workers reflects the need of 
companies to employ people with different skills sets, or simply a way to save money by 
getting rid of long-time employees who in the US workplace have traditionally received a 
pay premium for their seniority.   
 
The possibility that the substitution of younger for older personnel is just about cost 
reduction, and not about skill acquisition, is particularly possible when the change in the 
age-composition in employment is achieved through offshoring to lower-wage regions.  
In their book on “turbulence” in employment that compares the financial services, retail 
food, semiconductor, software, and trucking industries, Clair Brown, John Haltiwanger, 
                                                 
28  “IEEE-USA releases ‘Misfortune 500’ list of displaced high-tech workers,” PR Newswire, October 12, 
1998.  See also Langbein 1998.  According to Norman Matloff (email April 10, 2006 at 
heather.cs.ucdavis.edu/Archive/IEEEUSAHastensDemise.txt), among the most vocal critics of corporate 
and government policies that have generated surpluses of experienced engineers, in 2000 “IEEE-USA 
came under heavy pressure from the IEEE parent organization, which is dominated by industry and 
academia and thus is highly pro-H-1B.  So IEEE-USA suddenly changed its stance.  It still was critical of 
the H-1B program, but it started extolling “instant green cards” for foreign workers instead of H-1B 
visas.  It ignored member complaints that the green card idea would be just as harmful to IEEE-USA 
members as H-1B.  The Misfortune 500 Web page was taken down.” 
29 2006 IEEE-USA Unemployment Survey Results (10.19.06), at  
http://www.ieeeusa.org/careers/pdf/EmploymentSurvey2006Report.pdf.  Alan Hyde (2003, ch. 12) 
argues that employment discrimination law, including that which relates to age discrimination, is based 
on “an assumption of stable long-term careers inside individual firms”, and is very difficult to prove in 
the context of what he calls “a high-velocity labor market” such as exists in Silicon Valley. 
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and Julia Lane (2005, 108) suggest that both factors may be at work in ICT, thus posing a 
double whammy for older, higher-paid employees: 
 
In sum, jobs at the bottom end of the earnings distribution and in low-
skilled industries are much less likely to be stable than jobs at the top end 
and in high-skilled industries.  However, a particularly intriguing finding 
is that the two industries, software and semiconductors, that have been 
most affected by globalization and rapid technological change are also the 
two industries that have the lowest retention rates for workers in the top 
income category.30 
More research is also needed on what skills older employees actually lack in an NEBM 
setting.  The details of an age-discrimination lawsuit at Google are instructive.  In 2002, 
Google hired Brian Reid, age 52, as director of operations and director of engineering.  
Reid had been a pioneer in setting Internet standards in the 1970s when he was doing a 
doctorate in computer science at Carnegie Mellon University.31  He subsequently was on 
the faculty of Stanford University, co-founded a company that later became Adobe, and 
joined DEC’s research organization in 1987 where he worked until taking a position at 
Bell Lab’s Silicon Valley site in 1999.   Google demoted Reid in October 2003 and fired 
him in February 2004, just ahead of Google’s lucrative IPO in April 2004.  In his lawsuit, 
which as of late 2007 was still before the courts, Reid charged that the reason he was 
given for his dismissal from Google was that he was not “a cultural fit”.    
That message was delivered by Google vice-president of engineering, Wayne Rosing, 
himself 55 at the time, who had previously written an evaluation of Reid that described 
him as having “an extraordinarily broad range of knowledge concerning operations, 
engineering in general, and an aptitude and orientation toward operational and IT issues.” 
In the same evaluation, however, Rosing had written: “Adapting to the Google culture is 
the primary task for the first year here ... Right or wrong, Google is simply different: 
Younger contributors, inexperienced first-line managers and the super fast pace are just a 
few examples of the environment.” Another of Reid’s supervisors, 15 years his junior, 
informed Reid that his ideas were “obsolete” and “too old to matter” (Egelko 2007; Riley 
2007; Rosencrance 2007).  Reid claimed that he was also told by various Google 
managers that he was an “old man” and an “old fuddy-duddy” as well as that he was 
“fuzzy”, “slow”, “lethargic”, “lacked energy”, and “did not display a sense of urgency”, 
among other ostensibly ageist epithets.  One report on the website TechCrunch noted that 
when Reid would leave the office at 7PM, “he was regularly asked why he wasn’t 
remaining at work when Google provided dinner for its employees” (Riley 2007). 
Of the many comments on the TechCrunch piece, one by a blogger identified as S. is 
worth quoting for its succinct summary of the relation between the expenditure of work 
effort and employment expectations in the New Economy: 
 
                                                 
30 Italics in original. 
31 “Brian Keith Reid, Ph.D.” at http://justus.anglican.org/reid.html 
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October 13th, 2007at 5:40PM 
Like many tech companies, Google hires the young by selling them an 
illusion. The illusion is that working these 14 hour days gets you ahead. 
The truth is that this effectively reduces your compensation to 50% of 
what you were hired for, and guarantees you nothing. Youthful enthusiasm 
chooses to ignore this, and for the hiring company, it’s fantastic. 
Older workers have seen through this illusion. It is not that they are less 
intelligent or less motivated, just they are less inclined to be manipulated. 
It only takes one or two layoffs to figure out the game, and how disposable 
all of us are. This is the wisdom garnered from experience. 
The irony in all this is that we “older” workers were the young “rising 
stars” in our industry at one time that pulled these long hours. The new 
group of “rising stars” fails to realize that we are their future.32 
Under NEBM, companies want to retain workers who have, or are willing to learn, the 
requisite skills, and who, in a highly competitive environment with “time-to-market” as a 
key to profitability, are willing to work long and hard.33   At a company like Microsoft, 
for example, software programming is a highly collective and cumulative process in 
which the generation of a faster, better, and cheaper product depends on the integration of 
the work of hundreds of individual contributors (Cusumano 2000). A high level of 
productivity at a company like Microsoft depends on a relatively low level of labor 
turnover that in turn reflects a relatively high level of dependence of a particular 
employee on his or her current employer for remunerative work.   
 
Bill Gates lobbies the US government for an expansion in the H-1B visa program not 
simply, or even primarily, because the availability of more high-tech workers will help to 
keep down wage costs.  If Microsoft wants to lower its wage bill, it can offshore more 
routine activities to India or China, as indeed it does.  For work that is kept in the United 
States, however, the problem for Microsoft is not the wages of labor but rather the 
productivity of labor.  While, given its growth and profitability, Microsoft certainly offers 
any given employee the possibility of a career with the company, in NEBM fashion the 
company makes no commitment to retaining those employees over the course of their 
careers.  Well aware of the possibility of changes in the company’s employment strategy 
that could bring a career within that company to an end, and supported by a labor market 
that encourages interfirm mobility, employees at a company like Microsoft are on the 
                                                 
32 Comment 71 at http://www.techcrunch.com/2007/10/11/does-googles-equality-drive-extend-to-old-
people/#comments (with minor corrections of spelling). 
33 For evidence on these internal job ladders and career paths in the US semiconductor and software 
industries (along with financial services, retail food, and trucking) see Brown et al. 2005, ch. 5.  For 
example, they find that “[h]igh-educated male semiconductor workers find the best job ladders in 
growing firms with low turnover; high-educated women find the best job ladders only in large growing 
semiconductor firms with low turnover.  A woman shouldn’t expect to find good job ladders in financial 
services.  Their best jobs are in software, especially for high-educated women, where large growing firms 
provide the best job ladders for all high-educated software workers.” (Brown et al. 2005, 77). 
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lookout for employment opportunities with other companies that might be beneficial to 
their personal careers.  All other things equal, the larger the available high-tech labor 
supply, the more dependent are current high-tech workers on employment with their 
current company, and the greater power of the employer to demand that these employees 
work long and hard. 
 
Labor productivity, that is, depends on effort as well as skill, and tight labor markets 
reduce the power of employers to demand that their employees deliver high levels of 
work effort (see Lazonick 1990).  An exclusive focus on wage rates as the equilibrating 
mechanism in the labor market misunderstands the nature of the problem from an 
employer’s point of view, especially in a high-wage, high-skill sector of the economy.  
The key issue for ICT employers operating in the United States is not the level of 
remuneration per se but the lack of control over the work effort of a highly mobile labor 
force.   
 
It is a problem that was recognized in the first decades of the 20th century in leading 
sectors of the US economy.  The OEBM solution was the creation of career employment 
that used the realistic promise of promotion to positions with better pay and work 
conditions as a prime mode of inducing more and better effort from employees.  Indeed, 
in the capital-intensive mass-production industries such expectations of career 
employment even extended to “semiskilled” shop floor workers who could work their 
way up internal job ladders as “hourly” employees (Lazonick 1990, ch. 7-10).  Under 
NEBM, in which career employment is neither offered nor expected, the OEBM solution 
to the problem of work effort loses its force.    
 
Here then is the significance of Bill Gates’ demand for unlimited H-1B visas.  The 
holders of H-1B visas are much more dependent on their current employer for continuing 
employment.  Moreover, they also tend to be younger than citizen members of the US 
ICT labor force (see Table 2).  Among electrical/electronic engineers, the median age of 
H-1B workers approved in 2002 was 32 years compared with 41 years for US citizen 
workers, while among systems analysts/programmers these median ages were 31 and 37 
respectively.  The combination of youth and dependence renders them able and willing to 
work long and hard.  Moreover, as already mentioned, these up-and-coming H-1B visa 
holders are ideal recruits for a company operating in the United States that may want its 
employees to pursue global career paths as it decides to offshore higher value-added 
activities.  With years of experience in the United States, still young former H-1B holders 
from places like China and India can be very valuable to a company as, through the 
company’s offshored operations, they follow their global career paths back to the 
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Table 2: Age-distribution of H-1B visa beneficiaries approved in 2002 









 H-1B US H-1B US H-1B US      
Source: US Government Accounting Office 2003, 14, 42. 
Median age 32 41 31 37 35 39 
% distribution 
by age group 
      
20-24 2 5 2 6 1 4 
25-29 27 11 37 17 12 20 
30-34 33 12 39 19 34 14 
35-40 22 21 16 19 37 17 
41+ 16 52 6 39 16 45 
 
Increasing the supply of highly qualified ICT labor 
 
For global ICT employers like Microsoft, there are three ways of increasing the supply of 
young ICT workers: in-migration, offshoring, and, over the longer term, US K-12 
education that prepares US citizens for higher education relevant to ICT.  Given that the 
education systems of nations such as China and India have been generating massive 
numbers of potential ICT workers, both in-migration and offshoring have become the 
most viable solutions in the here and now of the 2000s.  It has been estimated that in 
2003-2004, US universities awarded (in round numbers) 137,000 four-year bachelor’s 
degrees in engineering, computer science, and information technology compared with 
139,000 in India and 361,000 in China (Wadhwa et al. 2007, 75).  The US number for 
2003-2004 was up sharply from 109,000 in 1999-2000, but it declined to 134,000 in 
2004-2005.  The increase in these bachelor’s degrees awarded in China and India 
exhibited a much steeper trajectory during the 2000s, with further growth in 2004-2005. 
 
The greatly increased availability of a global supply of high-quality high-tech labor, via 
either in-migration or offshoring, in the 2000s, has raised concerns in the United States 
about the adequacy of the US K-12 education system to prepare the next generation of 
entrants to the US labor force to compete in the global high-tech labor market.  While the 
specter of a massive flow abroad of the best high-tech jobs is a phenomenon of the 2000s, 
the concern with the adequacy of the K-12 system for preparing US youth for the “new 
world of work” is not new.  Since the early 1980s, various interests, including business 
associations, civil society organizations, and government agencies, have expressed 
concern with the adequacy of the US K-12 education system in providing students with 
levels of proficiency in math and science needed to pursue college degrees in the STEM 
disciplines.   
 
In 1981, the US Secretary of Education created the National Commission on Excellence 
in Education because of “the widespread public perception that something is seriously 
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remiss in our educational system”.34  The inquiry of the Commission paid particular 
attention to educational deficiencies among teenage youth.  In its 1983 report, A Nation 
at Risk: The Imperative for Educational Reform (National Commission on Excellence in 
Education 1983), the Commission highlighted the lack of preparedness of American 
youth for the world of work “at a time when the demand for highly skilled workers in 
new fields is accelerating rapidly”.35 The Commission noted: 
• “International comparisons of student achievement, completed a decade ago, reveal 
that on 19 academic tests American students were never first or second and, in 
comparison with other industrialized nations, were last seven times.”  
• “There was a steady decline in science achievement scores of U.S. 17-year-olds as 
measured by national assessments of science in 1969, 1973, and 1977.” 
• “Between 1975 and 1980, remedial mathematics courses in public 4-year colleges 
increased by 72 percent and now constitute one-quarter of all mathematics courses 
taught in those institutions.”  
 
In the 2000s it would appear that the nation is still at risk.  The United States participates 
in the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) that has done 
three rounds of data collection and analysis on the literacy in reading, mathematics, and 
science of 15-year-old students around the world.  The first assessment, done in 2000, 
focused on reading; the second assessment, done in 2003, focused on mathematics; and 
the third assessment, done in 2006, focused on science.  In PISA 2000, the reading 
performance of US students was just above the average for the 27 participating OECD 
nations, with the United States ranked 15th (Lemke et al. 2001, 7).  In PISA 2003, the 
mathematics performance of US students was significantly below the OECD average, 
with the United States ranked 24th of 29 OECD countries (Lemke et al. 2004, 14-15).36  
In PISA 2006, the science performance of US students was significantly below the 
OECD average, with the United States ranked 21st of 30 OECD countries (Baldi et al. 
2007, 6).    
 
In all cases, in the United States blacks and Hispanics did significantly worse on these 
assessments than whites and Asians (Lemke et al. 2001, 50; Lemke at al. 2004, 38; Baldi 
et al. 2007, 55).  In the PISA 2000 reading rankings, US non-Hispanic whites had a score 
that would have placed them (as a hypothetical nation)  2nd after Finland and just ahead of 
Canada, while US blacks had a score (again as a hypothetical nation) that would have 
placed them 25th, leading only Luxembourg and Mexico.  In the PISA 2003 math 
rankings, US non-Hispanic whites, with a score above the OECD average, would have 
placed 13th out of 29 OECD countries, while US blacks would have ranked 28th, ahead of 
Mexico.  In the PISA 2006 science rankings, US non-Hispanic whites would have been 
7th among 30 OECD nations, while US blacks would have been last, just behind Mexico.  
In each case, US Hispanics performed better than US blacks, but well below the OECD 
average.  US Asians did less well than US non-Hispanic whites, and were above the 
OECD average in reading and math, but just below it in science.  Much of the poor 
showing of the United States as an actual nation in PISA, therefore, can be attributed to 
                                                 
34 http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/intro.html. 
35 http://www.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html.   
36 Trailing the United States were Portugal, Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Mexico.  
 33
Lazonick: The New Economy Business Model and Sustainable Prosperity 
deficiencies in the K-12 educations of blacks and Hispanics.  During this period, of the 
US population ages 15-19, non-Hispanic whites were 63 percent, blacks 15 percent, 
Hispanics 16 percent, and Asians 4 percent (US Census Bureau 2004-2005, 14-15). 
 
The relatively poor overall performance of the US K-12 system in international 
comparison cannot be attributed to a lack of spending on primary and secondary 
education.  In 2005 the United States spent 4.5 percent of GDP on elementary and 
secondary education data, a figure that was down slightly from the historic peak of 4.7 
percent reached in 2001 through 2003 (National Center for Education Statistics 2007, 
Table 25).  In 2003 the United States spent $8,900 per student in primary and secondary 
education, while France spent $7,200, Japan $6,800, and Germany $6,500 (Miller et al, 
2007, 45).  Yet all of these countries have consistently ranked better than the United 
States in the PISA scores. As shown in Table 3, where the United States falls short 
compared with major OECD nations is on teachers’ salaries adjusted for GDP per capita.  
The implication is that, compared with other advanced nations, K-12 teaching in the 
United States is a relatively unattractive occupation, especially in terms of remuneration.   
 
Table 3: Ratios of average annual salaries of public school teachers in US dollars 
(purchasing   power parity) to GDP per capita, G-6 countries, by education 
level and level of teacher training/experience 
 Average starting salary with 
minimum training expressed 
as a ratio of GDP per capita 
Average salary with minimum 
training plus 15 years of 
experience expressed as a 
ratio of GDP per capita 
 






England* 0.93 0.93 1.36 1.36 $30,800 
France 0.80 0.89 1.07 1.17           29,000  
Germany 1.31 1.47 1.63 1.80 28,800 
Italy 0.87 0.94 1.05 1.18 27,300 
Japan 0.83 0.83 1.55 1.55 29,600 
Scotland* 0.93 0.93 1.48 1.48 30,800 
United States 0.82 0.79 1.00 1.01 39,700 
   * GDP per capita for the United Kingdom 
Source: Miller et al. 2007, 44. 
 
These deficiencies of the US K-12 education system have been noted in two “Nation at 
Risk” reports for the 2000s.  One report, Tough Choices or Tough Times, was undertaken 
by the National Center on Education and the Economy (New Commission 2007).37 The 
other report, Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing America for 
a Brighter Future, was undertaken by the National Academy of Sciences at the behest of 
                                                 
37 In 1990 the National Center on Education and the Economy produced the report, America’s Choice: 
High Skills or Low Wages! (available at http://www.skillscommission.org/pdf/High_SkillsLow_ 
Wages.pdf).   According to a statement in NCEE 2007, vii: “The National Center on Education and the 
Economy is a nonprofit organization created to develop proposals for building the world-class education 
and training system that the United States must have if it is to continue to be a world-class economy.  The 
National Center engages in policy analysis and development and works collaboratively with others at the 
local, state, and national levels to advance its proposals in the policy arena.” 
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Congress, beginning in 2005.38 Tough Choices focuses almost entirely on the 
transformation of the K-12 system as a condition for US competitiveness, and almost all 
the members of its “New Commission on the Skills or the American Workforce” were 
academics, civil servants, and politicians whose bios reflect a concern for, and substantial 
work on, the system of primary and secondary education.   Rising Above, which formed 
the basis for the (laboriously named) America Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully 
Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science (COMPETES) Act passed by 
Congress in August 2007, focuses much more on public support for the development of 
science and technology (S&T) capabilities as a condition for US competitiveness. Its 
(rather pompously named) Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy in the 21st 
Century was composed of eight academics, six corporate executives, and five presidents 
of major universities (Committee 2007, iv).  Whereas the Tough Choices Commission 
included four former US Secretaries of Labor or Education and a number of high-level 
public school officials, the Rising Above Committee had only one public school official 
(Nancy S. Grasmick, Maryland State Superintendent of Public Schools).  All of the 
academics on the Rising Above Committee were in science and engineering, while, of the 
two academics on the Tough Choices Commission, one was an economist (Ray Marshall 
of the University of Texas, also a former Secretary of Labor in the Carter Administration) 
and one was a professor of early childhood and family policy (Sharon Lynn Kagan of 
Columbia University).  Rising Above had no representatives of the labor movement on its 
Committee, whereas Tough Choices had two (Morton Bahr, former president of the 
CWA, and Dal Lawrence, former president of the Toledo Federation of Workers). 
 
These two reports provide very different, but generally complementary, perspectives on 
how to restructure the US system of education and knowledge creation to expand the 
high-quality employment opportunities available to US citizens in the 21st century.  I will 
summarize the main arguments of each report, and show the implications of the rise and 
dominance of NEBM for the problems that these reports highlight and policies that they 
propose.  Based on this analysis, I will then conclude this paper by focusing attention on 
a critical dimension of the future of employment in the US economy that both of these 
reports completely ignore – namely the governance of high-tech corporations so that they 
make the business investments, and support the government investments, that will be 
necessary to provide a larger proportion of Americans will high value-added jobs over 
the next generation. 
 
The central argument of Tough Choices or Tough Times is that “[t]he problem is not with 
our educators.  The problem is with the system in which they work” (New Commission 
2007, xxi).  The report advocates the setting of high-level achievement standards, through 
two stages of State Board Exams administered in high school, that encourage students to 
reach their full potential, at an accelerated pace if possible, rather than, as is currently the 
case, have standard tests that represent the lowest common denominator for getting 
students out of high school (New Commission 2007, xxiii).  While the Commission 
highlights the deficiency of US school in teaching math and science, it also argues that 
                                                 
38 The chairman of the committee responsible for Rising Above the Gathering Storm, Norman Augustine, 
retired chairman and CEO of Lockheed Martin and former secretary of the Army, presented the report to 
Congress in October 2005.    
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“high earnings are not just associated with people who have high technical 
skills….History, music, drawing and painting, and economics will give our students an 
edge just as surely as math and science will” (New Commission 2007, 29). 
 
The Commission calls for a reduction in bureaucracy by taking control of schools away 
from local school districts and having them “operated by independent contractors, many 
of them owned and run by teachers” (New Commission 2007, xxvii).  These contract 
schools would be a variant of charter schools, an educational innovation that enables a 
party that wants to deliver high-quality public high school education to enter into a 
contract with the state that bypasses many existing bureaucratic rules and procedures but 
requires that the school meet the performance criteria, typically focusing on the education 
of disadvantaged youth, contained in its charter.  In 2007 over one million children 
attended some 3,500 charter schools in 40 states as well as DC and Puerto Rico.39   
 
Tough Times places particular emphasis on creating new terms for the employment of 
teachers: annual salaries (adjusted for local cost-of-living differences) that would start at 
“about $45,000, which is now the median teachers’ pay,” rising to “about $95,000 per 
year to the typical teachers working at the top of the new career ladders for a regular 
teaching year and as much as $110,000 per year to teachers willing to work the same 
hours per year as other professionals typically do”.  Further, the Commission 
recommends that “teachers be employed by the state, not the local districts, on a 
statewide salary schedule”.  Specifically, “[t]he current policies regarding teacher 
education would be scrapped.  The state would create a new Teacher Development 
Agency charged with recruiting, training, and certifying teachers.”  Teachers would have 
to hold “at least a bachelor’s degree in the subject they propose to teach and would have 
to pass a rigorous teaching and performance assessment” (New Commission 2007, xxiv).   
 
The Commission also advises that, in order to attract younger teachers, the defined-
benefit pensions that most public school teachers get should be replaced by defined 
contribution plans or cash-balance plans.  Indeed, the report argues that when one takes 
into account lifetime remuneration from defined benefit pension plans and retirement 
health benefits – a benefit that it notes has been “rapidly becoming untenable in the 
private sector” -- public school teachers actually get paid “above the average for people 
with comparable amounts of education” (New Commission 2007, 60-61).  The advantage 
of these alternative pension plans, the Commission notes, is portability; the report gives 
the example of TIAA-CREF for college teachers that provides “complete portability 
across the whole country” (NCEE 2007, 62). 
 
A transformation of pension systems reflects a transformation in employment relations 
(Lazonick 2007a).  Indeed the vision that the Commission has for K-12 public schools 
                                                 
39 See the US Charter School website at http://www.uscharterschools.org/pub/uscs_docs/o/history.htm. One 
of only two dissenting comments published with the Tough Choices report came from the Commission’s 
two labor representatives, Dal Lawrence and Morton Bahr, who warned that “[t]he [report’s] design for 
contract schools can become an open door for profiteers.  One of us is a citizen of Ohio, where charter 
school legislation has resulted in almost universal poor student achievement, minimal accountability, and 
yet considerable profits for charter operators, many with peculiar agendas.”  (New Commission 2007, 96)  
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entails the transition from tenured employment with one school to a flexible teachers’ 
labor market that resembles employment relations under NEBM.  The second half of 
Tough Choices is written as a retrospective scenario on the implementation of the 
Commission’s recommendations from the vantage point of the year 2021, 15 years after 
the report was written.  The proposed transformation of employment relations, the 
scenarist observes, had “cost money, especially in teachers’ salaries.” 
 
Many states concluded that they were not going to get value for money 
unless they could be sure that they could set market rates for teachers in 
shortage subjects, get rid of seniority as a principle of teacher assignment, 
compensate teachers based on their actual classroom performance, retrain 
teachers who were not able to do the job expected of them, and fire those 
who could not do it after retraining. 
 
To implement these dramatic changes in employment relations, the Commission scenarist 
continues (New Commission 65-67), many states legislated that the state itself would 
become the teachers’ employer, “a change that happened much more quickly than many 
had predicted.”   
 
These changes produced a revolution in the teaching profession.  A 
surprisingly large fraction of students from the best colleges in the country 
decided to make teaching their first career.  Many stayed for only five or 
six years, but many others stayed much longer.  And some who stayed 
only five or six years, and then went on to do something else, decided to 
return later.  Many of the best retired teachers who had gone on to other 
careers decided to come back.  These teachers worked whatever hours 
were required to get the job done…. 
 
The new state schedules for teachers were partly based on the new career 
ladders, which were based not on seniority but on the quality of the 
teacher’s work. In these systems, teachers who were most successful at 
producing outstanding student performance were paid more and were 
asked to demonstrate their methods to other teachers, sharing the methods 
that accounted for their success.  As the public became aware of how hard 
it was to get into school teaching, and schools enjoyed more and more 
success, even with the students who had been hardest to teach, the status 
of teachers shot up.  For the first time in anyone’s memory the number of 
people applying for teaching positions outnumbered the available 
positions. 
 
Tough Choices also talks about changes in student incentives and the provision of public 
pre-kindergarten schooling.  But the transformation of the terms on which public school 
teachers are employed is at the heart of the Commission’s proposals.  In effect, it 
proposes a new “business model” for the K-12 system.  The expected product of this 
“business model” will be a new generation of American workers who are capable of 
competing for high value-added jobs in the global economy.  The Commission does not, 
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however, address the critical question of whether, given globalization, these jobs will 
become available in sufficient numbers in the United States to provide appropriate 
employment for this new generation of well-educated workers.  If not, what will be the 
incentives for cynical students and hard-pressed teachers, along with the investing public, 
to transform the way in which the underperforming classes of students are educated? 
 
As we have seen, these underperforming classes of students are predominantly black and 
Hispanic.  In the case of blacks, the War on Poverty, launched in the mid-1960s, was by 
the 1970s helping them access good-paying union jobs in mass-production industries.  
Blacks who had in the 1970s moved into these good manufacturing jobs were 
disproportionately affected by the permanent downsizing of OEBM labor forces that 
began in the blue-collar recession of 1980-1982 and continued with the plant closings and 
widespread layoffs in the ensuing years (Kletzer 1991; Fairlie and Kletzer 1998).40  As 
William Julius Wilson has argued, this deterioration in the employment prospects of 
blacks with high-school education had far-reaching adverse impacts on the stability of 
family life in urban centers that were predominantly black, the quality of K-12 education 
that blacks received, and the extent to which black communities were capable of 
supporting the upward social mobility of their members (Wilson 1987 and 1991-1992). 
 
These problems of black and Hispanic poverty persist in the 2000s.  But whereas until the 
late 1970s a high school education could still be sufficient to land one a good job with an 
Old Economy company, in the New Economy of the 2000s one needs a higher degree to 
secure entry into labor markets that offer decent wages.  As shown in Table 4, increasing 
proportions of the black and Hispanic populations, 25 years old or over, have attained 
university degrees at the bachelor’s level or higher.  Nevertheless their numbers still lag 
far behind those of the white population.  And, as shown in Table 5, in 2006 blacks and 
Hispanics were also still lagging whites at the associate’s degree level.  The critical 
question going forward in the 2000s is whether, given the globalization of the high-tech 
labor force, blacks and Hispanics as groups will be able to take advantage of new 




                                                 
40 On review of the literature on the deterioration of black employment and earnings from the late 1970s to 
the early 1990s, see Holzer 1994. 
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Table 4:  Attainment of bachelor’s degrees or higher of the 
US population, age 25 or over, by race/ethnicity, 
1975-2006 
 
Percent of race/ethnicity group 
  Total White Black Hispanic 
1975 13.9 14.9 6.4 6.6
1980 17.0 18.4 7.9 7.6
1985 19.4 20.8 11.1 8.5
1990 21.3 23.1 11.3 9.2
1995 23.0 25.4 13.3 9.3
2000 25.6 28.1 16.6 10.6
2001 26.1 28.6 16.1 11.2
2002 26.7 29.4 17.2 11.1
2003 27.2 30.0 17.4 11.4
2004 27.7 30.6 17.7 12.1
2005 27.6 30.5 17.7 12.0
2006 28.0 31.0 18.6 12.4
Source:  National Center for Education Statistics 2007, Table 8. 
 
Table 5: Levels of educational attainment, US population, age 25 or over, by race/ethnicity, 
2006 
(in thousands) Total White Black Hispanic 
Population 25 years and over 191,884 135,661 20,913 23,499 
Less than high school graduation 27,896 12,831 3,942 9,567 
Graduated high school 60,898 43,955 7,496 6,672 
Some college 32,611 24,011 3,969 2,974 
Associate's degree 16,760 12,855 1,616 1,379 
Bachelor's degree 35,153 27,376 2,661 2,068 
Master's degree 13,053 10,313 972 566 
Professional degree 3,050 2,423 158 176 
Doctorate 2,464 1,898 99 97 
  % of race/ethnicity group 
 % of  
total population 
Whites Blacks Hispanics 
Population 25 years and over 100.0 70.7 10.9 12.2 
Less than high school graduation 14.5 9.5 18.8 40.7 
Graduated high school 31.7 32.4 35.8 28.4 
Some college 17.0 17.7 19.0 12.7 
Associate's degree 8.7 9.5 7.7 5.9 
Bachelor's degree 18.3 20.2 12.7 8.8 
Master's degree 6.8 7.6 4.6 2.4 
Professional degree 1.6 1.8 0.8 0.7 
Doctorate 1.3 1.4 0.5 0.4 
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While some progress has been made, thus far blacks and Hispanics are not well 
represented in the STEM occupations -- in sharp contrast not only to whites but also to 
people of Asian origin in the US population, as is shown in Tables 6 and 7.   As can be 
seen in Table 6 which shows the proportions of racial and ethnic minorities in the non-
social-science STEM occupations since 1950 (with more detailed occupational 
breakdowns since 1970), over the last half of the 20th century blacks increased their 
representation in these occupations relative to their representation in the labor force as a 
whole by 5 times, but in 2000 this ratio was still only 0.55:1.  Hispanics did even worse.  
As they came to represent about as large a proportion of the labor force as blacks by the 
end of the 20th century, their representation in the STEM occupations actually declined, 
falling from 0.48:1 in 1980 to 0.46:1 in 1990 to 0.43:1 in 2000.  Contrast the experience 
of blacks and Hispanics with that of Asians, who represented less than 4 percent of the 
labor force in 2000, but over 10 percent of the non-social-science STEM occupations.  
Table 6 shows, moreover, that much of the progress that blacks and Hispanics made in 
these STEM occupations in the last decades of the century were at the lower-paid 
technician levels – occupations that are among the most vulnerable to be offshored.  
Indeed, from 1990 to 2000, the growth of the representation of both blacks and Hispanics 
into science technician jobs lagged the growth of their representation in the overall labor 
force.  Meanwhile, the absolute proportions of blacks in life sciences and physical 
sciences actually declined from 1990 to 2000, even as their proportional representation in 
the labor force increased.  In contrast, while the Asian representation in the labor force 
went up just over 1 percentage point from 1990 to 2000, their representation among both 
life scientists and physical scientists went up by more than 6 percent in each. 
 
Table 7 displays the situation in 2006, with finer occupational breakdowns.  Note the vast 
overrepresentation of Asians as computer software engineers, computer hardware 
engineers, and medical scientists, while blacks were overrepresented as operations 
research analysts and chemical technicians.  Women also still remain significantly 
underrepresented in the non-social-science STEM occupations, particularly engineering. 
In 2006, women were 46.3 percent of the labor force and 56.9 percent of all professional 
and related occupations, but only 7.7 percent of electrical and electronics engineers and 
5.8 percent of mechanical engineers.  In the 2003 PISA, US males performed somewhat 
better than US females in mathematics literacy (486 versus 480) (Lemke et al. 2004, 35). 
Nevertheless, from the perspective of the engineering profession, it is women with math 
capabilities who are the prime targets for recruitment in the United States.41 While some 
of these women are obviously from ethnic minorities, it will remain females as a social 
group, rather than blacks or Hispanics, who will attract the attention of those concerned 
with bringing more Americans into engineering education. 
 
 
                                                 
41 I am grateful to John Hodgman of the UMass Lowell Faculty of Engineering for providing me with 
information on the importance of women to the future of the engineering professions. 
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Table 6: Workers in STEM occupations by race and ethnicity, 1950-2000 
Types of workers, in thousands 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
All workers reporting an occupation 60,288 69,053 81,450 105,665 124,773 138,754
All STEM, except social scientists 874 1,466 2,657 3,239 4,648 6,520
Life sciences 42 52 82 126 159 222
Physical sciences 98 115 166 188 250 372
Engineering 556 859 1,250 1,470 1,781 1,820
Mathematics and information technology 25 27 377 646 1,457 3,267
Science technicians 112 251 514 190 215 299
Engineering technicians  27 136 261 618 785 540
Percent black       
All workers reporting an occupation 9.8 9.7 9.8 10.1 10.5 10.9
All STEM, except social scientists 1.0 1.2 2.1 4.1 5.2 6.0
Ratio, All STEM workers: All workers 0.11 0.12 0.22 0.41 0.50 0.55
Life sciences   3.2 3.8 3.9 2.9
Physical sciences   2.9 3.7 4.4 4.0
Engineering   1.1 2.5 3.5 4.0
Mathematics and information technology   2.9 5.4 6.3 7.1
Science technicians   3.1 7.2 9.0 9.1
Engineering technicians    2.9 5.7 7.0 7.5
Percent Hispanic       
All workers reporting an occupation 1.4 1.6 1.9 5.7 8.1 10.7
All STEM, except social scientists 0.6 0.8 1.8 2.7 3.7 4.6
Ratio, All STEM workers: All workers 0.40 0.46 0.98 0.48 0.46 0.43
Life sciences    2.5 3.1 3.7
Physical sciences   1.7 2.1 2.9 3.5
Engineering   1.4 2.2 3.2 3.9
Mathematics and information technology   1.4 2.6 3.2 4.5
Science technicians   3.0 4.4 6.5 7.3
Engineering technicians    2.7 4.0 5.5 7.4
Percent Asian       
All workers reporting an occupation 0.2 0.5 0.8 1.6 2.8 3.9
All STEM, except social scientists  0.8 1.5 3.9 6.3 10.2
Ratio, All STEM workers: All workers   1.49 1.77 2.35 2.25 2.60
Life sciences    3.9 6.4 13.8
Physical sciences   2.8 5.5 6.8 13.9
Engineering  0.8 1.5 4.3 6.8 8.9
Mathematics and information technology   1.2 3.9 6.7 11.4
Science technicians   1.4 2.9 5.2 6.9
Engineering technicians    1.2 2.5 4.6 5.5
Source: Lowell and Regets 2006, 16-18. 
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Table 7: Employed civilians in STEM occupations by sex, race, and ethnicity, 2006 






All occupations, persons 16 years and over 144,427 46.3 13.6 10.9 4.5
Professional and related occupations 29,187 56.9 6.4 9.3 7.1
STEM OCCUPATIONS       
Computer and mathematical occupations 3,209 26.7 5.0 7.3 16.2
   Computer scientists and systems analysts 715 31.9 5.0 9.5 12.7
   Computer programmers 562 25.3 5.3 3.9 18.1
   Computer software engineers 846 21.8 3.4 5.8 26.9
   Computer support specialists 314 28.9 7.2 10.5 7.4
   Database administrators 90 37.0 3.0 8.9 14.8
   Network and computer systems administrators 180 16.6 7.0 4.4 11.0
   Network systems and data communications analysts 356 25.5 6.0 7.9 8.1
   Operations research analysts 85 40.3 4.0 18.1 6.6
Architecture and engineering occupations 2,830 14.5 5.9 5.6 9.7
   Architects, except naval 221 22.2 7.7 3.2 11.5
   Aerospace engineers 110 13.1 5.1 5.6 12.9
   Civil engineers 304 11.9 4.0 5.0 8.2
   Computer hardware engineers 80 16.2 7.4 3.8 26.5
   Electrical and electronics engineers 382 7.7 4.2 5.9 15.8
   Industrial engineers, incl. health & safety 174 22.6 2.9 7.0 5.9
   Mechanical engineers 322 5.8 4.0 4.3 9.5
   Drafters 181 21.8 10.3 3.0 6.8
   Engineering technicians, except drafters 396 20.6 11.2 9.3 5.3
   Surveying and mapping technicians 96 9.9 8.5 3.0 0.3
Life, physical, and social science occupations 1,434 43.3 4.1 5.7 12.2
   Biological scientists 116 46.6 3.8 3.5 11.9
   Medical scientists 164 45.4 2.4 5.3 35.6
   Chemical and material scientists 116 34.1 1.7 7.4 13.3
   Environmental scientists and geoscientists 101 22.0 1.8 2.9 3.4
   Market and survey researchers 129 61.3 3.4 9.0 8.7
   Psychologists 189 67.7 3.5 2.6 2.2
   Chemical technicians 76 35.9 8.8 11.4 4.4
Source: US Census Bureau 2008, 388. 
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Ultimately, whether blacks and Hispanics prosper in the New Economy will depend on 
their employment progress at the major US high-tech companies.  In general, very little 
publicly available data on employment by race and ethnicity at the company level are 
available.  In recent years, however, as an apparent response to the “corporate social 
responsibility” movement, a few ICT companies have begun to provide data on 
employment by race, ethnicity and sex as part of the diversity sections of their “global 
citizenship” reports.  The major ICT companies for which such data are available are HP, 
Intel, and IBM. 
 
For 2004-2006, HP provides a breakdown of all of its US employees by gender, race, and 
ethnicity across a range of positions in the corporate hierarchy from officers and 
managers at the top to laborers at the bottom.  Table 8 shows this distribution for 2006.  
Of all US employees, 13 percent were officers and managers, 71 percent professionals, 
and 8 percent technicians, leaving a total of 8 percent for the other five employment 
classifications further down the hierarchy.  Note that in 2006 females, blacks and 
Hispanics were underrepresented as HP US employees relative to their participation in 
the labor force, while males, non-Hispanic whites, and Asians were overrepresented.  
Relative to their representation among HP’s US employees, blacks and Hispanics were 
underrepresented among officers/managers and professionals. Asians were over-
represented as both professionals and laborers. 
 
HP also provides data for all employees and those employed in the officers and managers 
categories from 2002 through 2006.  During this time, the total number of people 
employed by HP in the United States fell from 67,350 to 54,085, even as its worldwide 
employment increased from 141,000 to 156,000, with the result that US employment fell 
from 48 percent to 35 percent of the total.  With the exception of Native Americans 
(whose numbers increased from 258 in 2002 to 287 in 2006), every group included in 
Table 8 lost jobs over this period.  But the largest declines as a proportion of the jobs held 
in 2002 were for blacks, whose net loss was 25 percent of 3,718 jobs, and females, whose 
net loss was 24 percent of 22,160 jobs.  Every group lost officers and managers jobs, with 
Native Americans experiencing a net loss of 33 percent of the 30 such positions held in 
2002, followed by blacks with a net loss of 27 percent of 309 jobs.   
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Table 8: Distribution of employment at HP, by sex, race, and ethnicity, 2006 
Type of employment Total Male Female White Black Hispan. Asian Native 
Amer. 
Officials and managers  6,868 5,020 1,848 5,776 225 355 492 20 
Professionals  38,325 26,578 11,747 29,338 1,782 2,054 5,023 128 
Technicians  4,307 3,792 515 3,288 329 320 342 28 
Sales workers  758 505 253 653 39 43 18 5 
Office and clerical  2,310 371 1,939 1,736 231 214 123 6 
Craft workers (skilled)  28 27 1 24 3 1 0 0 
Operatives (semi-skilled)  311 212 99 181 43 38 35 14 
Laborers  1,178 635 543 631 132 164 165 86 
Total  54,085 37,140 16,945 41,627 2,784 3,189 6,198 287 
         
Percent Total Male Female White Black Hispan. Asian Native 
Amer. 
Officials and managers  100.0 73.1 26.9 84.1 3.3 5.2 7.2 0.3 
Professionals  100.0 69.3 30.7 76.6 4.6 5.4 13.1 0.3 
Technicians  100.0 88.0 12.0 76.3 7.6 7.4 7.9 0.7 
Sales workers  100.0 66.6 33.4 86.1 5.1 5.7 2.4 0.7 
Office and clerical  100.0 16.1 83.9 75.2 10.0 9.3 5.3 0.3 
Craft workers (skilled)  100.0 96.4 3.6 85.7 10.7 3.6 0.0 0.0 
Operatives (semi-skilled)  100.0 68.2 31.8 58.2 13.8 12.2 11.3 4.5 
Laborers  100.0 53.9 46.1 53.6 11.2 13.9 14.0 7.3 
Total  100.0 68.7 31.3 77.0 5.1 5.9 11.5 0.5 
Note: In 2006 proportional representation in the US employed civilian labor force was males, 53.7 
percent; females, 46.3 percent, whites (non-Hispanic), 70.4 percent; blacks, 10.9 percent; Asians 
4.5 percent; Hispanics, 13.6 percent; Native Americans, 0.6 percent. 
Source: HP 2006 Global Citizenship Report, 141-142. 
 
 
Intel reported diversity data for 2001-2006 for the US labor force as a whole and for 
officers and managers.42 Over this period, despite a decline in Intel’s US employment 
from 54,219 (65 percent of the company’s worldwide total) to 50,348 (54 percent), blacks 
increased their employment from 2.4 percent (1,286 jobs) in 2001 to 3.6 percent in 2006 
(1,787 jobs), although a peak of 1,849 jobs was reached in 2005. Hispanics were far 
better represented than blacks at Intel; they increased their employment from 6.1 percent 
(3,322 jobs) in 2001 to 9.0 percent in 2006 (4,474 jobs), although a peak of 4,647 jobs 
was reached in 2005.  As at HP, however, Asians did best at Intel’s US operations over 
this period; they increased their employment from 14.4 percent (7,815 jobs) in 2001 to 
25.3 percent in 2006 (12,712 jobs).  The 2006 Asian headcount surpassed that of 2005, 
notwithstanding the fact that there was a net reduction of over 3,600 Intel employees in 
the United States during 2006.  Among officers and managers, blacks held 1.6 percent of 
the positions in 2001 rising to 2.0 percent in 2006; Hispanics 6.1 percent rising to 8.9 
percent; and Asians 9.2 percent rising to 20.4 percent.  Intel reported diversity data for 
                                                 
42 The company also provided data on the sex, race and ethnicity of the board of directors (11 positions), 
corporate officers (32 positions in 2001-2005, and 25 in 2006), and the top 50 people in the company.  
Except for one Hispanic in a top 50 position in 2001, no other Hispanics and no blacks were represented 
in these categories.    
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the professional category in 2002 only, with blacks holding 1.9 percent of these positions, 
Hispanics 4.9 percent, and Asians 24.2 percent. 
 
For observing the impact of changes in the employment on different social groups in the 
economy, IBM’s diversity data is the most useful among the ICT companies.43  It covers 
not only seven different types of employment but also 11 years from 1996 through 2006 
(see Tables 9 and 10).  The period begins at a time when IBM had already undertaken the 
massive restructuring that enabled it to rid itself of the institution of lifetime employment, 
and make the transition from OEBM to NEBM (Lazonick 2008, ch. 4).  From 1996 to 
2001, IBM increased its worldwide employment from 217,000 to 319,000, with its US 
employment increasing from 126,000 to 152,000.  In 2006, the company’s worldwide 
headcount stood at almost 356,000, but its US employment had declined to 134,000.  In 
the process, the share of US employment in the worldwide total fell from 52 percent in 
1996 to 38 percent in 2006.   
 
As can be seen in Table 9, with IBM 2006 US employment almost 7 percent above its 
1996 level, the proportion of US employees in marketing increased 2.5 times over the 
decade, while the proportion who worked as operatives almost disappeared, falling 
steadily from 12.3 percent of the total in 1996 to 1.3 percent in 2006.  Other employment 
areas that experienced significant proportionate declines were technicians and 
office/clerical.  Unfortunately, as can be seen in Table 10, in 1996 over 43 percent of 
blacks – 5,739 employees -- were clustered in the operative and office/clerical categories 
in 1996.  In 2006, as the combined result of divestments of manufacturing facilities and 
offshoring, IBM employed only 121 black operatives in the United States, down from 
3,474 a decade earlier.  In 2006 the largest cluster of black employees was in 
office/clerical work, but they held only 61 percent of the jobs in this area than they had 
ten years before.  Blacks benefited from the growth of marketing in terms of numbers of 
positions held, although the black proportion in this area declined from just under 8 
percent in 1996 to just over 7 percent in 2006.   
 
On net, blacks had 2,201 fewer jobs at IBM in 2006 than in 1996, while every other 
diversity group saw its headcount rise.  Note that the employment of all diversity groups 
was hard hit by the massive decline in operative jobs, but groups other than blacks more 
than made up for it through job growth in higher level areas of employment.  Asians, for 
example, increased their net employment by almost 6,000 jobs over the decade, so that 
the Asian proportion of IBM’s total US employment rose from almost 8 percent to almost 
12 percent, with marketing shooting up by over 9 percentage points to 14.6 percent in 
2006.  Blacks gained jobs as professionals, but not nearly as many as females, Asians, 
and Hispanics, and they actually had a net loss of positions as officials/managers, even 
though for IBM’s US operations as a whole the total number employed at this level was 
greater in 2006 than in 1996. 
 
 
43 Given the importance of these type of data to policy-making in the United States, there is no reason why 
all companies should not follow IBM’s example in making detailed diversity data publicly available on 
an annual basis. 
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Table 9: IBM, distribution of US employment by type of employment, 1996-2006 
Type of Employment 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Officials/Managers 16,638 18,018 20,388 22,307 23,837 19,464 18,018 17,494 17,494 17,385 17,363 
Professionals 54,805 49,847 58,139 61,747 62,080 65,084 62,140 60,120 60,353 55,827 55,742 
Technicians 12,534 13,159 17,528 16,508 15,760 15,639 13,068 12,319 11,992 11,549 10,349 
Marketing 15,798 32,331 29,294 31,855 34,384 36,891 40,697 39,783 39,699 40,052 42,133 
Office/Clerical 8,880 8,680 8,939 8,432 8,048 7,327 6,670 7,412 6,747 5,951 5,409 
Craft Workers 1,628 3,421 2,966 2,693 2,478 2,546 1,687 1,444 1,338 1,232 1,193 
Operatives 15,415 11,031 10,237 7,058 7,000 5,244 3,425 2,450 2,276 1,971 1,784 
Totals 125,618 136,487 147,491 150,600 153,587 152,195 145,705 141,022 139,899 133,967 133,973 
Worldwide employees 240,615 269,465 291,067 307,401 316,303 319,876 315,889 319,273 329,001 329,373 355,766 
Percent US employees 52.2 50.7 50.7 49.0 48.6 47.6 46.1 44.2 42.5 40.7 37.7 
            
Percent of group total            
Officials/Mgrs 13.2 13.2 13.8 14.8 15.5 12.8 12.4 12.4 12.5 13.0 13.0 
Professionals 43.6 36.5 39.4 41.0 40.4 42.8 42.6 42.6 43.1 41.7 41.6 
Technicians 10.0 9.6 11.9 11.0 10.3 10.3 9.0 8.7 8.6 8.6 7.7 
Marketing 12.6 23.7 19.9 21.2 22.4 24.2 27.9 28.2 28.4 29.9 31.4 
Office/Clerical 7.1 6.4 6.1 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.6 5.3 4.8 4.4 4.0 
Craft Workers 1.3 2.5 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.7 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 
Operatives 12.3 8.1 6.9 4.7 4.6 3.4 2.4 1.7 1.6 1.5 1.3 
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
NOTE: Tables reflect all regular and complementary U.S. employees. The company's complementary workforce includes various workers hired under temporary, part-time and 
limited-term employment arrangements 
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Table 10: Distribution of US employment at IBM by race, sex , and ethnicity, 1996 and 2006 
Source: IBM website: http://www-03.ibm.com/employment/us/diverse/employment_data.shtml 
 IBM 1996  IBM 2006 
Type of  
Employment 








Officials/Mgrs 16,638 12,513 4,125 1,149 616 452 54  17,363 12,343 5,020 990 1,288 579 117 
Professionals 54,805 39,124 15,681 3,641 4,580 1,667 152  55,742 37,438 18,304 3,926 7,524 2,337 316 
Technicians 12,534 11,248 1,286 834 444 649 44  10,349 9,119 1,230 923 584 611 79 
Marketing 15,798 11,444 4,354 1,248 850 477 66  42,133 30,514 11,619 2,985 6,130 1,639 250 
Office/Clerical 8,880 2,951 5,849 1,905 235 480 43  5,409 1,558 3,851 1,171 229 352 68 
Craft Workers 1,628 1,422 206 161 102 62 4  1,193 751 442 95 58 37 5 
Operatives 15,415 8,613 6,802 34,74 2,882 1,271 69  1,784 1,154 630 121 109 54 13 
Totals 125,618 87,315 38,303 12,412 10009 5058 432  133,973 92,877 41,096 10,211 15,922 5,609 848 
Percent of  
area total 








Officials/Mgrs 100.0 75.2 24.8 6.9 3.7 2.7 0.3  100.0 71.1 28.9 5.7 7.4 3.3 0.7 
Professionals 100.0 71.4 28.6 6.6 8.4 3.0 0.3  100.0 67.2 32.8 7.0 13.5 4.2 0.6 
Technicians 100.0 89.7 10.3 6.7 3.5 5.2 0.4  100.0 88.1 11.9 8.9 5.6 5.9 0.8 
Marketing 100.0 72.4 27.6 7.9 5.4 3.0 0.4  100.0 72.4 27.6 7.1 14.5 3.9 0.6 
Office/Clerical 100.0 33.2 65.9 21.5 2.6 5.4 0.5  100.0 28.8 71.2 21.6 4.2 6.5 1.3 
Craft Workers 100.0 87.3 12.7 9.9 6.3 3.8 0.2  100.0 63.0 37.0 8.0 4.9 3.1 0.4 
Operatives 100.0 55.9 44.1 22.5 18.7 8.2 0.4  100.0 64.7 35.3 6.8 6.1 3.0 0.7 
Totals 100.0 69.5 30.5 9.9 8.0 4.0 0.3  100.0 69.3 30.7 7.6 11.9 4.2 0.6 
Percent of  
group total 








Officials/Mgrs 13.2 14.3 10.8 9.3 6.2 8.9 12.5  13.0 13.3 12.2 9.7 8.1 10.3 13.8 
Professionals 43.6 44.8 40.9 29.3 45.8 33.0 35.2  41.6 40.3 44.5 38.4 47.3 41.7 37.3 
Technicians 10.0 12.9 3.4 6.7 4.4 12.8 10.2  7.7 9.8 3.0 9.0 3.7 10.9 9.3 
Marketing 12.6 13.1 11.4 10.1 8.5 9.4 15.3  31.4 32.9 28.3 29.2 38.5 29.2 29.5 
Office/Clerical 7.1 3.4 15.3 15.3 2.3 9.5 10.0  4.0 1.7 9.4 11.5 1.4 6.3 8.0 
Craft Workers 1.3 1.6 0.5 1.3 1.0 1.2 0.9  0.9 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.7 0.6 
Operatives 12.3 9.9 17.8 28.0 28.8 25.1 16.0  1.3 1.2 1.5 1.2 0.7 1.0 1.5 
Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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A New Agenda for Investment in S&T 
 
Over all, then, in an age of high–tech global competition, the data on education and employment by 
race and ethnicity in the United States strongly suggest that significant groups within American 
society will still face “tough times” some 15 years hence, if proposals to transform the K-12 education 
system do not address directly the systemic socioeconomic barriers to advancement that still face 
large proportions of blacks and Hispanics in the United States.  That having been done, the “tough 
choices” that public policymakers must confront cannot be confined to the “supply-side” problem of 
the transformation of the K-12 system alone, as the “New Commission on Skills of the American 
Workplace” has done.   They must also consider the types of policies that can deal with the “demand-
side” problem of the expansion and augmentation of high-tech employment in the United States in the 
face of the apparently irreversible tendency for former US jobs of ever higher quality to go abroad.44   
The challenge of sustainable prosperity in the United States is not simply to replace the jobs that 
disappear but to generate an ever-expanding number of high-quality jobs that can draw members of 
previously excluded groups into the remunerative and meaningful work. 
 
Such is the challenge that Rising Above the Gathering Storm apparently takes up.   At the outset, the 
“Committee on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century” makes it clear that the future 
prosperity of the United States depends on investing in the nation’s science and technology 
capabilities: 
 
The prosperity the United States enjoys today is due in no small part to investments the 
nation has made in research and development at universities, corporations, and national 
laboratories over the last 50 years. Recently, however, corporate, government, and 
national scientific and technical leaders have expressed concern that pressures on the 
science and technology enterprise could seriously erode this past success and 
jeopardize future US prosperity. Reflecting this trend is the movement overseas not 
only of manufacturing jobs but also of jobs in administration, finance, engineering, and 
research. (Committee 2007, ix) 
 
Rising Above the Gathering Storm contains a set of recommendations about what to do about this 
threat to the nation’s future.  The Committee makes four recommendations (Committee 2007, 5-12), 
which I quote: 
 
Recommendation A: Increase America’s talent pool by vastly improving the K-12 
science and mathematics education. 
 
Recommendation B: Sustain and strengthen the nation’s traditional commitment 
to long-term basic research that has the potential to be transformational to 
maintain the flow of new ideas that fuel the economy, provide security, and 
enhance the quality of life. 
 
Recommendation C: Make the United States the most attractive setting in which 
to study and perform research so that we can develop, recruit, and retain the best 
                                                 
44 For a recent critique of the argument that there is a shortage of qualified science and engineering graduates in the United 
States, see Lowell and Salzman (2007). 
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and brightest students, scientists, and engineers from with the United States and 
throughout the world. 
 
Recommendation D: Ensure that the United States is the premier place in the 
world to innovate: invest in downstream activities such as manufacturing and 
marketing; and create high-paying jobs based on innovation by such actions as 
modernizing the patent system, realigning tax policies to encourage innovation, 
and ensuring affordable broadband access. 
 
Recommendations A, B, and C would form the foundation for the America COMPETES Act, which 
became Public Law 110-69 on August 9, 2007.  
 
The implementation of Recommendation A (K-12 education) requires a) the annual recruitment of 
10,000 science and math teachers to the K-12 science, with 4-year college scholarships as an 
inducement; b) education and training programs for 250,000 existing teachers; and c) an increase the 
number of high school students who have attained levels of science and math that will enable them to 
graduate from college with degrees in science, engineering, or mathematics.   
 
The implementation of Recommendation B (national research effort) requires a) federal government 
investment in long-term basic research that increases by 10 percent over the next seven years; b) five-
year, $500,000 research grants to 200 outstanding researchers in the United States who are at the early 
stages of their careers; c) the setting up of a national advanced research coordinating office to manage 
the allocation of $500 million in incremental research funds over the next five years; d) the allocation 
of at least 8 percent of federal research budgets to discretionary funding; e) the creation within the 
Department of Energy an agency analogous to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA); and f) the establishment of a Presidential Innovation Award for science and engineering 
advances that are in the national interest. 
 
The implementation of Recommendation C (pool of scientists and engineers) requires a) 25,000 new 
undergraduate scholarships annually for bachelor’s degrees in the physical sciences, life sciences, 
engineering, and mathematics for which US citizens attending US institutions of higher education 
would be eligible to compete; b) 5,000 new graduate fellowships for US citizens for studies in “areas 
of national need”; c) a federal tax credit to companies for the cost of providing continuing education 
to the scientists and engineers whom they employ; d) the streamlining of visa processing for foreign 
students and scholars; e) one-year automatic visa extensions to foreign recipients of doctorates from 
US institutions in science, technology, engineering, mathematics, or other fields of national interest, 
with, subject to security clearance, automatic work permits and fast-tracks to permanent residencies 
when offered jobs by employers based in the United States; and f) new immigration preferences based 
on skills; and g) the reform of “deemed exports” regulation that currently excludes foreigners engaged 
in fundamental research in the United States from access to certain science and technology 
information that they need to make creative contributions to the US S&T effort. 
 
The implementation of Recommendation D (incentives for innovation) requires a) enhanced 
intellectual property protection; b) augmented research and development tax credits to business; and 
c) tax incentives to companies for carrying out innovation in the United States: and d) ubiquitous 
broadband access. 
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The body of Rising Above provides details on the form, content, and potential impact of these 20 
actions items.  At the end of the report, the Committee outlines three scenarios that could ensue, 
depending on what actions are in fact taken to strengthen the nation’s S&T capabilities.   In the first 
scenario, if nothing changes in approaches to S&T in the United States or abroad, the United States 
will be able to live off its current lead for a generation but in the process will suffer economic decline. 
“Today’s leadership position,” the Committee (Committee 2007, 219) recognizes, “is built on 
decisions that led to investments made over the past 50 years. The slow erosion of those investments 
might not have immediate consequences for economic growth and job creation, but the long-term 
effect is predictable and would be severe.”  In the second scenario, the United States lessens its 
commitment to S&T, an approach that “would run counter to our national history” (Committee 2007, 
219).  Under this scenario, “[t]he rapid pace of technological change and the increasing mobility of 
capital knowledge and talent mean that our current lead in science and technology could evaporate 
more quickly than is generally recognized if we fail to support it. The consequences would be 
enormous, and once lost, our lead would be difficult to regain” (Committee 2007, 220).  In the third 
scenario, the United States (following the recommendations of the Committee) increases its 
commitment to S&T.  Even in this scenario, “[t]he relative competitive lead enjoyed by the United 
States will almost certainly shrink as other nations rapidly improve their science and technology 
capacity” (Committee 2007, 221).  But the results of innovation based on S&T is not zero-sum. By 
following this approach, the United States will help “to raise living standards and improve quality of 
life around the world and to create a safer world.”  Given the globalization of innovation, the US 
share of the world economy will inevitably fall even under the most optimistic scenario, but 
depending on the S&T effort that the United States makes, the absolute standard of living of 
Americans as a nation could, and should, rise. 
 
In conclusion,45 the Committee warns: 
 
It is easy to be complacent about US competitiveness and preeminence in science and 
technology.  We have led the world for decades, and we continue to do so in many 
research fields today. But the world is changing rapidly, and our advantages are no 
longer unique. Some will argue that this is a problem for market forces to resolve—
but that is exactly the concern. Market forces are already at work moving jobs to 
countries with less costly, often better educated, highly motivated workforces and 
friendlier tax policies. 
 
Without a renewed effort to bolster the foundations of our competitiveness, we can 
expect to lose our privileged position.  For the first time in generations, the nation’s 
children could face poorer prospects than their parents and grandparents did. We owe 
our current prosperity, security, and good health to the investments of past 
generations, and we are obliged to renew those commitments in education, research, 
and innovation policies to ensure that the American people continue to benefit from 
the remarkable opportunities provided by the rapid development of the global 
economy and its not inconsiderable underpinning in science and technology. 
 
                                                 
45 This version of the conclusion is taken from the Executive Summary (Committee 2007, 12-13). 
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The Committee recognizes at various points throughout the report that, for this commitment to 
science and technology to benefit the American people as a whole, the science and math education for 
blacks and Hispanics must be transformed (Committee 2007, 95, 131, Appendix D).  But will a 
renewed and augmented commitment of the US government to investment in S&T necessarily result 
in an increase in the quality and quantity of business sector jobs that available to the next generation 
of US graduates of higher education?  In concluding the description of the pessimistic first scenario 
mentioned above, the Committee (2007, 219) recognizes that “[i]ncreasingly, it is no longer true that 
what is good for GM (or GE or IBM or Microsoft) is good for the United States.” 
 
What it means to be a US company is likely to change as all multinationals 
continue to globalize their operations and ownership. As China and other 
developing nations become larger markets for many products and services, and as 
they maintain their cost advantages, US companies will increasingly invest there, 
hire there, design there, and produce there. This nation’s science and technology 
policy must account for the new reality and embrace strategies for success in a 
world where talent and capital can easily choose to go elsewhere. 
 
What might those “strategies for success” be?  Specifically, to what extent and in what ways, will 
“rising above the gathering storm” require changes in the ways in which business corporations are 
regulated in the United States?  On this critical issue, the Committee is silent, perhaps because it 
chooses to view the resource allocation decisions of companies such as Cisco, HP, IBM, Intel, and 
Microsoft as “market forces” that are presumably outside the purview of legitimate government 
policy – but yet cannot be relied upon to ensure that good jobs are created in the United States.  Based 
on the analysis that I have provided in this book, however, I would submit that for the Committee’s 
20-point plan for government investment in S&T to have any chance of resulting in prosperity for 
most Americans over the next generation, the government will have to intervene strategically to 
influence the allocation of resources by business corporations, US-based and foreign, that make use of 
the high-tech knowledge and highly qualified people that would result from such a massive 
government effort to “rise above the gathering storm”.    
 
Corporate governance for sustainable prosperity 
 
The critical area for strategic policy intervention -- yet one that is totally absent from the US S&T 
policy debate – is on the role of the stock market in the corporate allocation of resources.  There are 
two interrelated areas of corporate governance in which government intervention is needed.  The 
government needs to enact legislation that restricts the practice of corporate stock repurchases.  The 
government also needs to enact legislation that drastically reins in top executive pay, which means 
placing restrictions on stock-based remuneration, especially stock options. 
 
Stock repurchases are out of control, especially among high-tech companies.  In 2006, on average for 
496 companies in the S&P500 index in October 2007, net income was $1,521 million, dividends $484 
million, stock repurchases $908 million, and R&D expenditures $351 million.  In 2007 eight major 
ICT companies – Cisco, Dell, HP, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, and Sun -- expended a total of $67.1 
billion on repurchases compared with $28.7 billion on R&D – a ratio of 2.3:1.46  Clearly, the 
                                                 
46 The 2007 repurchase and R&D data in billions of dollars are: Cisco, 7.7 and 4.5;  Dell, 3.0 and 0.5;  HP, 10.9 and 3.6; 
IBM, 18.8 and 6.1; Intel, 11.5 and 5.8; Microsoft, 27.6 and 7.1; Oracle, 3.9 and 2.2; and Sun, 0.2 and 2.).   
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extraordinary profitability of many US corporations from 2003 through 2006 gave them the 
wherewithal to do repurchases on an unprecedented scale.  Over these four years combined, the 
S&P500 companies averaged $4.9 billion in net after-tax income, and distributed an average of $2.2 
billion in repurchases and $1.6 billion in dividends to shareholders.   
 
More generally, one might argue that companies do repurchases because the marginal productivity of 
other types of resource allocation, such as investments in R&D, is very low (see, for example, Weiss 
1997); that is these repurchases reflect what agency theorists call “free cash flow” (Jensen 1986; for a 
critique, see Lazonick 2007c).   But, if that were the case, why would the Committee on Prospering in 
the Global Economy of the 21st Century recommend tax breaks to these companies to encourage 
innovation?  Indeed, given the extent to which, as the Committee acknowledges, the US government 
has made the critical investments in the knowledge base on which these US-based companies can 
draw, should not these companies be the ones who are paying more, not less, taxes to the government, 
both as a return on the taxpayers’ investments and to help fund the augmented government S&T 
expenditures that the Committee recommends?  And if indeed the marginal productivity of investment  
in R&D is low -- and there is no evidence that such is the case, much less that it is the factor driving 
stock repurchases – perhaps it could be increased if these companies themselves invested in basic 
research in corporate labs, as was the case with their Old Economy predecessors (see Rosenbloom and 
Spencer 1996), and thus increased their capacities to contribute to the fundamental knowledge base 
and absorb externally generated knowledge.  That is, the marginal productivity of R&D may be 
dependent less on how much a company spends on R&D and more on what types of investments in 
R&D it makes. 
 
That having been said, it is unlikely the one would find high-tech top executives who would argue 
that stock repurchases are driven by a lack of profitable opportunities (see, for example, Baker et al. 
2003).  Corporate executives could argue that they have to do massive stock repurchases so that their 
stock will be attractive as a combination and compensation currency, which in turn will support the 
accumulation of innovative capabilities.  There are a number of problems with this argument.47   
 
When used as a combination currency to acquire other companies, there is no doubt that a company 
with a soaring stock price will have a competitive edge.  But that soaring stock price will tend to be 
the result of innovation and/or speculation rather than redistribution through stock repurchases.  Such 
is the case for Cisco Systems, which from 1993 through 2007 acquired 125 companies.  It used its 
stock as an acquisition currency during the period in which its stock price rose through innovation and 
speculation but from 2003 through 2007 relied almost exclusively on cash as the currency for 45 
acquisitions for a total of $14.3 billion even as it also dispensed $43.1 billion for stock repurchases 
(Lazonick 2007c).  Indeed, one might argue that companies that are doing large-scale stock 
repurchases will refrain from using stock as a combination currency.  Otherwise, all other things 
equal, the stock repurchases would have to be even larger to offset dilution from stock-based 
acquisitions. 
 
When used as a compensation currency in the form of stock options, the reward to an employee is 
supposed to be reaped in future years when the stock price has risen as the innovative investments of 
                                                 
47 For an in-depth analysis in the context of the New Economy boom and bust of the late 1990s and early 2000s of the 
conditions under which the use of stock as a combination and compensation currency can support, or undermine, the 
innovation process, see Carpenter et al. 2003. 
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the company generate revenues.  Does the use of repurchases to boost stock prices today help a 
company attract and retain employees?  Yes, when labor markets are tight,48 but only if employees 
expect that the company will be willing and able to do repurchases systematically over time – which 
is perhaps a reason why Intel has a page on its website that shows all the buybacks that it has done 
going back to 1990, with only one quarter (Q3 of 2003) having been missed since Q2 of 1993.49  If 
employees think that the company may not be able to sustain its repurchase program, or that, 
alternatively, in allocating resources to stock repurchases, the company has foregone critical 
investments in innovation required to make it competitive in the future, they might see today’s 
repurchases as a sign that it is time to cash in their vested options and leave.  Hence once a company 
starts down the path of stock repurchases, executives may feel compelled to remain on that path if the 
company is going to use buybacks to increase the value of its stock as a compensation currency.  At 
some point, however, this commitment to supply cash to the stock market may undermine the 
financial commitment that, particularly in highly competitive global industries, is essential to fund 
innovation.   
 
Companies often state explicitly in their financial statements that they are doing stock repurchases to 
offset dilution from their stock option programs.  Even from a shareholder-value perspective, the 
economic rationale for this argument is not clear.  If a company that seeks to maximize shareholder 
value deems it worthwhile to partially remunerate employees with stock options, it should see that 
remuneration as adding to rather than subtracting from earnings per share.  True, these additions to 
earnings per share may only accrue in years to come; but then, from the shareholder-value 
perspective, the issue is simply one of whether remuneration in the form of stock options (or any other 
mode of compensation) is expected to yield positive net present value of future earnings at the 
appropriate discount rate.  “Disgorging the cash flow” through stock repurchases may provide short-
term support for a company’s stock price at the expense of the generation of profits over the long run.    
 
Top executives often simply argue that in doing stock repurchases, they, as corporate decision-
makers, are “signaling” confidence that their company’s stock price will rise over the long-term (see 
Louis and White 2007).  Yet, from a financial point of view, such an investment would only make 
sense if one could expect that at some point in the future when innovation and speculation have 
resulted in an overvalued stock, the corporation would turn from being a purchaser to a seller of its 
own stock.  Otherwise, corporate executives are taking the position that their stock can never be over-
valued, even in a highly speculative boom.  According to the “signaling” argument, we should have 
seen massive sales of corporate stock in the speculative boom of the late 1990s, as was the case of US 
industrial corporations in the speculative boom of the late 1920s.  Indeed in the boom of the late 
1990s corporate executives as personal investors sold their own stock to reap the speculative gains 
(often to the tune of tens of millions, and in some cases even hundreds of millions of dollars).  Yet if 
anything these same corporate executives as corporate decision-makers used corporate funds to 
repurchase shares and, to their own personal gain, push the speculative stock price even higher.  
Given the extent to which stock repurchases have become a systematic mode of corporate resource 
allocation, and given the extent to which through this manipulation of their corporation’s stock price 
top executives have enriched themselves personally in the process, there is every reason to believe 
that, in the absence of legislation that restricts both stock repurchases and  the gains from stock 
                                                 
48 For an in-depth analysis of the attraction, retention, motivation, and recognition functions of employee stock options, 
and the labor-market conditions under which they might perform different functions, see Glimstedt et al. 2006. 
49 http://www.intc.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=101302&p=irol-stockBuyBack 
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options, executive behavior that places personal interests ahead of corporate interests will continue in 
the future.50 
 
Stock repurchases are, in my view, central to a massive redistribution process that has made the rich 
even richer at the expense of stable and equitable economic growth.  It is a process that received 
ample encouragement from the inaptly named Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003 that reduced tax rates on dividends from 38.6 percent (the top tax on ordinary income) to 15 
percent and on capital gains (including of course those from selling stock) from 20 percent to 15 
percent (McNamee and Scherreik 2003).  Despite the fact that the 2003 Act reduced the tax on 
dividends even more than the tax on capital gains, since 2002, as we have seen, US corporations have 
increased stock repurchases even more than they have increased dividends (Blouin et al. 2007).  The 
main reason, in my view, is that repurchases tend to boost stock prices, which in turn increases the 
returns from stock options.51  I have shown that the gains from stock options of the people at the top 
of the corporation are typically hundreds of times, and often thousands of times, the average gains per 
employee in their company (Lazonick 2007c).  Certainly, as in the late 1990s, when the stock market 
has moved up rapidly, millions of non-executive employees who held stock options benefited, and at 
companies like Cisco and Microsoft, smaller numbers of non-executive employees benefited 
immensely.  For many if not most non-executive employees, however, the gains from stock options 
were ephemeral, as the decline of the early 2000s was followed by the “jobless recovery” of 2003 in 
which the acceleration of offshoring played an important role.     
 
When combined with lavish stock option grants, stock buybacks are an important part of the 
explanation of the continuing explosion in CEO pay in the 2000s.  Yet there has been to my 
knowledge no public policy debate over the practice of buybacks, its acceleration in recent years, or 
the implications for both the distribution of income and economic growth.  Should, as the Committee 
on Prospering in the Global Economy of the 21st Century argues, the US government invest in the 
S&T knowledge base when the high-tech companies that make use of this knowledge base allocate 
the lion’s share of their profits to pump up the value of their stock rather than make investments that 
can return greater value to the American taxpayers who have been footing the bills? 
 
In the high-tech arena, the problem is not confined to ICT.  In the pharmaceutical industry, there has 
long been a debate over the high prices of prescription drugs in the United States compared with other 
parts of the world including Japan and the high-wage nations of the European Union (Love 1993; 
Frank 2004).  The pharmaceutical companies argue that, since so much of the research on these drugs 
is done in the United States, they need to charge higher prices to fund R&D.  This is an industry that 
                                                 
50 It should be noted in this regard that most countries do not permit stock repurchases (Grullon and Michaely 2002, 1677).  
Indeed, until 1982 the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had at times viewed stock repurchases as a 
manipulation of a company’s stock price. As Grullon and Michaely (2002, 1649) put it: “[U]ntil 1982, there were no 
explicit rules directly regulating share repurchase activity in the United States. This situation exposed repurchasing 
firms to the risk of triggering a SEC investigation and being charged with illegal market manipulation.” In that year, 
however, as part of the general deregulation of financial institutions that had been taking place since the late 1970s, the 
SEC “made it easier for companies to buy back their shares on the open market without fear of SEC stock-manipulation 
charges” (Hudson 1982).  Specifically, under Rule 10b-18, the SEC assured companies that manipulation charges would 
not be filed if each day’s open-market repurchases were not greater than 25 percent of the stock’s average daily trading 
volume (see Grullon and Michaely 2002, 1676-1682). 
51 Also slowing the growth of dividends relative to repurchases is the fact that insofar as a company that pays dividends 
reduces its shares outstanding through repurchases, it automatically reduces the total amount of dividends that it pay out. 
 54
Lazonick: The New Economy Business Model and Sustainable Prosperity 
is the direct beneficiary of some $28 billion per year spent on life sciences research by the National 
Institutes of Health (NIH).  Indeed, from the launch of the NIH in 1938 through 2007, the US 
government invested $615 billion in 2007 dollars in life sciences research.  Yet if one looks at the 
financial behavior of the largest drug companies, as Table 11 shows, a number of them distribute 
more cash to their shareholders in the forms of dividends and repurchases than they spend on R&D. 
Indeed over this decade Pfizer distributed more cash to shareholders in the form of repurchases than 
dividends, and the two combined were 18 percent higher than its net after-tax income.  Over the 
decade 1997-2006, Merck did repurchases equal to 81 percent of R&D expenditures, Pfizer 76 
percent, and Johnson & Johnson 54 percent of R&D expenditures.  When the substantial dividends 
that these companies pay are added to their repurchases, the ratio of distributions to R&D shoots up to 
179 percent at Merck, 135 percent at Pfizer, and 110 percent at Johnson & Johnson.  Indeed for the 
period 1995-2001 Merck did buybacks that were 1.49 times its R&D expenditures, making total 
distributions 2.65 times its R&D expenditures. 
 
Table 11: Distributions to shareholders in the forms of dividends and stock 
repurchases by the seven largest US-based pharmaceutical companies, 1997-2006 
 Sales,  
2006 
TD/NI (TD+RP)/NI RP/R&D (TD+RP)/R&D
 $m 1997-2006 1997-2006 1997-2006 1997-2006 
J&J 53,324 0.38 0.74 0.54 1.10 
Pfizer 48,371 0.52 1.18 0.76 1.35 
Merck 22,636 0.51 0.92 0.81 1.79 
Abbott 22,476 0.53 0.74 0.26 0.94 
Wyeth 20,351 0.60 0.73 0.13 0.70 
BMS 17,914 0.69 0.97 0.33 1.13 
Lilly 15,691 0.59 0.62 0.02 0.58 
TD=total (preferred plus common dividends; RP=stock repurchases; NI=net income after taxes but before 
extraordinary items; R&D=research and development 
Source: Compustat database 
 
The stock buyback disease also afflicts the largest independent biopharmaceutical companies. Among 
them in 2006, Amgen was the largest with $14.2 billion in revenues, and Genentech the second 
largest with $9.3 billion in revenues.  In keeping with NEBM, Amgen and Genentech do not pay 
dividends.  In 1997-2006 Amgen did $17.9 billion in buybacks, 97 percent of the level of its R&D 
expenditures, and Genentech did $5.3 billion in buybacks, 73 percent of the level of its R&D 
expenditures.  In 2003-2006 the proportion of repurchases to R&D was 110 percent at Amgen and 
109 percent at Genentech. Aided by this financial behavior, the CEO and other four highest paid 
executives at Amgen reaped an average of $92.1 million from gains from stock options for the period 
1997-2006, while the top 5 at Genentech averaged $109.2 million (Lazonick et al. 2007).   
 
That is not the end of the story.   In May 2007 Amgen borrowed $4.0 billion ($2.0 billion due in 2008, 
$1.1 billion in 2017, and $0.9 due in 2037), of which $3.2 billion would be used for buybacks 
(Amgen 10-Q, period ending June 30, 2007).  Through the first six months of 2007, Amgen 
repurchased a total of $5.0, of which almost $4.5 million was in the second quarter.  In July 2007 the 
Amgen board authorized an additional $5.0 billion stock repurchase.  But Amgen also experienced a 
second-quarter decline in sales of its blockbuster anemia drug Aranesp because of reported cases that 
high doses of the drug induced heart attacks (Chase 2007).  On August 13, just after Amgen issued its 
second quarter 10-Q filing that recorded the sales decline, an analyst at Bernstein Research noted that 
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“Amgen will likely lose at least 40 percent of their US Aranesp revenue by 2008 with even greater 
downside possible for both Aranesp and Epogen if upcoming [Medicare and Medicaid] 
reimbursement and regulatory decisions go against them.”  But the analyst reportedly added: “If 
Amgen cuts costs, continues to buy back stock and improves its tax rate…it could increase its 
earnings per share by 10-12 percent each year from 2008 to 2011, even if it does not develop any 
significant drug candidates.”52  Two days later, on August 15, Amgen announced that it would 
downsize its workforce by 14 percent, or 2,600 jobs, cut capital expenditures by $1.9 billion, close 
some of its production facilities, and reduce R&D expenses, which had been at 27 percent of sales 
from 2003 through 2006, to 20 percent of sales (Chase 2007).  It may well be that Amgen borrowed 
money to do its second-quarter repurchases because it wanted to offset the adverse impact of the 
Aranesp news on its stock price.  In any case, in the allocation of corporate resources, the top priority 
of Amgen’s top executives appears to be stock-price performance rather than sustainable productive 
performance. 
 
If, in the 2000s, the US Congress has not addressed the issue of massive and systematic stock 
repurchases and their adverse implications for sustainable prosperity, it has also stayed clear of debate 
over the influence of executive pay.  It has not always been this way.  As mentioned earlier, in the 
1960s until the Tax Reform Act of 1976, there was a legislative movement toward restricting the tax 
advantages of stock options.  All that changed in the last half of the 1970s as the newly organized 
high-tech lobby swung into action, and got the capital gains tax reduced, accounting rules changed, 
and stock repurchases permitted to enhance the benefits of employee stock options.  The high-tech 
lobby has had its political way ever since.   A particularly risible attempt to control CEO pay was the 
implementation in 1993 of President Bill Clinton’s campaign promise to legislate a cap of $1 million 
on the amount of non-performance-related, top-executive compensation that could be claimed as a 
corporate tax deduction. One perverse result of this law was that companies that were paying their 
CEOs less than $1 million in salary and bonus raised these components of CEO pay toward $1 
million, which was now taken as the government-approved “CEO minimum wage” (Byrne 1994). The 
other perverse result was that companies increased CEO stock option awards, for which tax 
deductions were not in any case being claimed, as an alternative to exceeding the $1 million salary-
and-bonus cap (Byrne 1995).  
 
In the US context, it is also quite laughable to construe the gains from stock options as “performance-
related” pay.  The greatest gains from stock options come in periods of stock-market speculation, 
when holders of options benefit from the fact that in the United States there is virtually never any 
requirement that option gains can only be reaped if a company’s stock does better than comparators in 
its industry.  And when the market is less speculative, buybacks help to manipulate the price of stock, 
and, presto, the “performance” of the company improves.   
 
In the 2000s, however, the employment insecurity that has resulted from the dominance of a stock-
market-oriented business model is anything but a laughing matter.  The Old Economy business model 
was hardly perfect, but it did provide employment security, health coverage, and retirement benefits 
to tens of millions of people whose work was at the heart of the economy.   Under NEBM, the 
                                                 
52 “Amgen moves up after analyst says company will restructure to increase earnings,” Associated Press Financial Wire, 
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corporate economy no longer assumes these collective functions.  In an era of open standards, rapid 
technological change, convergence of technologies, and intense global competition, business 
enterprises do need to be flexible in the deployment of capital and labor.  One way of attaining this 
flexibility is by giving the organized labor force a major role in enterprise governance, as for example 
the Japanese, Germans and Swedes have done, each in their own particular ways (Lazonick 2005 and 
2007d).   In such a system, there is the possibility of an interaction between business and government 
to provide widespread economic security in employment and retirement while remaining innovative 
and competitive on a global scale.  The other way is the American way in the era of NEBM, which, in 
an updated version of what I have elsewhere called “the myth of the market economy” (Lazonick 
1991), works under the pretense that the collective provision of economic security is not required.  
Just get enough education to be “employable” in a well-paid job, and individual initiative will provide 
one with the lifetime of security that one needs.  From the NEBM perspective, the only legitimate 
function of the government is to invest in the knowledge base, and even then with no notion that, 
through taxation, a substantial proportion of the gains from innovative enterprise that this knowledge 
base makes possible should be returned to the government to support the development of the economy 
as a whole.   
 
In the United States in the 2000s, the quest for economic security evades even a substantial portion of 
the better educated population.  In its stead stands the quest for shareholder value; the worship of 
wealth in the 2000s has rewritten the 1980s’ motto, “greed is good”, to read “greed is god”.  That 
small minority of the population that controls the allocation of corporate resources is reaping 
unprecedented wealth, while demanding that the government spend more of the taxpayers’ money on 
knowledge creation and warning that only lower taxes on their wealth can keep the spirit of 
innovation alive.   With the aid of a compliant government, the New Economy business model may 
continue to generate respectable economic growth – although, given global competition and the 
corporate allocation of resources, even that is debatable in the 2000s.  What does seem certain, 
however, is that for a growing majority of Americans, the stock-market oriented political economy 
that has NEBM as its foundation will generate instability and inequity as a normal way of life. 
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